Sex Offender Loses Adam Walsh Civil Commitment Appeal

12-10-2013 North Carolina:

U.S. v. SAVAGE
737 F.3d 304 (2013)

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, on December 10, 2013, the judgement of the District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina civilly committing appellant Richard Savage to post-incarceration confinement with the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) at their Butner, North Carolina facility. Savage was convicted in 2006 of distributing heroin in the District of Columbia and sentenced to three years imprisonment with the BOP. Reflective of Savage’s history of sexual offenses, though unrelated to his charge of incarceration, Savage was certified a “sexually dangerous person” and caused per the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act (18 U.S.C. §4248) to remain in the custody of the BOP after completion of his sentence.

Savage appealed, arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction under the Adam Walsh Act in that he was not “in the custody of the BOP” as required by §4248(a). He also asserted that in not releasing him to the supervision of the District of Columbia Court Services and Offender Supervision Agency Authority (CSOSA), the district court erred by not following the provisions of §4248(d).

Savage relied on a Fourth Circuit case wherein the prisoner, an ex-army officer, argued that under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), the military and BOP had a contractual agreement where the BOP housed military prisoners and that based on this contractual agreement, he was exempt from the strictures of the Adam Walsh Act because he was not under the legal custody (i.e. release, parole authority, etc.) of the BOP, but rather he belonged to the military for the final disposition. Savage maintained that D.C. code, under which he was incarcerated, was like the UCMJ, a separate body of law from Title 18, and that BOP maintained physical, but not legal, custody as required by §4248 to adjudicate a civil commitment. The district court denied Savage’s argument.

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Savage’s legal posture was dissimilar to the case which he claimed was “virtually indistinguishable” to his. The court pointed out that District of Columbia offenders are statutorily, as opposed to contractually, as is the case with military offenders, placed under BOP control, and that the BOP does have legal authority over the final disposition (parole, release, etc.) of District of Columbia prisoners, and that the BOP is the Attorney General’s designee in matters of confinement. The court also noted that because Savage never raised the issue of §4248(d), mandating his release to CSOSA, rather than civil incarceration, he effectively waived his right to do so in the high court. See: United States v. Savage, 737 F.3d 304 (4th Cir. N.C. 2013).

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Hughes v Farris

12-7-2015 Illinois:

Hughes v Farris

Michael Hughes alleges that an employee of the facility where he is civilly committed abused him because he is a homosexual; another employee suspended his treatment for complaining about it.

He is confined at the Treatment and Detention Facility in Rushville, Illinois, as a result of his designation as a sexually violent person for purposes of Illinois's Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act, 725 ILCS 207/1-99.

Invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Hughes sued Michael Farris, the supervisor of the laundry, and Krista Wilcoxen, Rushville's rehabilitation director. After interviewing Hughes at a "merit-review" hearing and screening his complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the district court concluded that he had failed to state a claim and dismissed the case. We vacate that judgment and remand.

Without vouching for anything, we recount the allegations in Hughes's complaint and, where consistent with the complaint, in his related filings. See Flying J Inc. v. City of New Haven, 549 F.3d 538, 542 n.1 (7th Cir. 2008).

Powers v Block

10-27-2015 Illinois:

Powers v Block

Powers' Complaint states a claim for violating his due process rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Brown v. Budz, 398 F.3d 904, 910 (7th Cir. 2005). The United States Supreme Court has held that "due process requires that the conditions and duration of confinement under the Act bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which persons are committed." Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 265 (2001). The Supreme Court has also opined that involuntarily committed mentally challenged persons have a substantive due process right to "conditions of reasonable care and safety, reasonably nonrestrictive confinement conditions, and such training as may be required by these conditions." Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982).

The Seventh Circuit has extended and summarized Youngerberg to include those individuals committed because they are sexually violent: "(a) committed persons are entitled to some treatment, and (b) what that treatment entails must be decided by mental-health professionals." Lane v. Williams, 689 F.3d 879, 882 (7th Cir. 2012)(internal quotation omitted). In other words, the Seventh Circuit has held that "Youngerberg holds that, under the due process clause, detainees are entitled to non-punitive programs designed using the exercise of professional judgment. . . ." Id. at 883.

Here, Powers has alleged that his treatment at Rushville has been so minimal and so inadequate that it has violated his Due Process Rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Fourteenth Amendment requires that Powers receive some treatment. Powers has alleged that he is, essentially, not receiving any. Therefore, Powers has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted against Defendants Jennifer Block, Gerrold Carreon, Shan Jumper, and Liberty Health Care Corporation.

In addition, Powers has alleged that Defendants Block, Carreon, Jumper, and Paula Lodge have retaliated against him because he has previously filed grievances and lawsuits against them and others at Rushville. Specifically, Powers contends that Defendants have threatened him, removed privileges, and withheld treatment because he has filed grievances and lawsuits. As such, Powers has stated a retaliation claim in violation of his First Amendment rights.

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED: