Merryfield v State

10-22-2010 Kansas:

Merryfield v State

For more than a decade, Dustin Merryfield has been confined at the Larned State Hospital under the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act, K.S.A. 59-29a01 et seq. He has filed a habeas-corpus petition under K.S.A. 60-1501 raising claims that go to the core of the Kansas treatment program for sexual predators: Merryfield claims that the program is run so poorly that it doesn't offer a realistic opportunity to cure or improve the mental abnormality for which he has been involuntarily confined. We must reverse the district court summary dismissal of Merryfield's petition because it raises constitutional claims of potential merit.

We also reverse the district court's decision refusing to appoint counsel to represent Merryfield in this habeas action. While there is no general right to counsel in civil habeas cases, the constitutionality of the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act depends upon the procedural rights given to those who are involuntarily committed under its provisions.

The Kansas Legislature has explicitly provided a right to counsel to such persons during annual review hearings and has explicitly provided a right to counsel in K.S.A. 60-1501 proceedings to those involuntarily committed under other similar statutes.

We therefore conclude that in the case of habeas actions brought by persons confined pursuant to the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act, those persons have a constitutional right to counsel if the district court determines that their petitions cannot be summarily dismissed.

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Pew v Sullivan

4-1-2014 Kansas:

Floyd W. Pew and 66 other members of the Kansas Sexual Predator Treatment Program (collectively referred to as Residents) appeal the district court's summary dismissal of their writ of habeas corpus challenging the program's decision to restrict their right to purchase consumable items to only three vendors.

Management of the Kansas Sexual Predator Treatment Program has failed to show its restricted vendor policy has a treatment or security-related basis.

We therefore remand for the appointment of counsel and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. ..Source.. by Kansas Court of Appeals

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Hughes v Farris

12-7-2015 Illinois:

Hughes v Farris

Michael Hughes alleges that an employee of the facility where he is civilly committed abused him because he is a homosexual; another employee suspended his treatment for complaining about it.

He is confined at the Treatment and Detention Facility in Rushville, Illinois, as a result of his designation as a sexually violent person for purposes of Illinois's Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act, 725 ILCS 207/1-99.

Invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Hughes sued Michael Farris, the supervisor of the laundry, and Krista Wilcoxen, Rushville's rehabilitation director. After interviewing Hughes at a "merit-review" hearing and screening his complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the district court concluded that he had failed to state a claim and dismissed the case. We vacate that judgment and remand.

Without vouching for anything, we recount the allegations in Hughes's complaint and, where consistent with the complaint, in his related filings. See Flying J Inc. v. City of New Haven, 549 F.3d 538, 542 n.1 (7th Cir. 2008).

In re Thomas S

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April 10, 2013 South Carolina:

In re Thomas S

We granted certiorari to review an unpublished decision by the Court of Appeals which held that trial court did not err in permitting witness Shellenberg to give an opinion. In re S., Op. No. 2011-UP-121 (S.C.Ct.App. filed March 24, 2011).

We agree with petitioner and find that Shellenberg, a lay witness, was improperly allowed to offer expert opinion testimony and that this error was not harmless. We therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings.

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The sole issue before the jury was whether petitioner was likely to reoffend, and Dr. Neller, the sole expert in the case testified he was not. The only evidence in the record of petitioner's "propensity to commit [future] acts of sexual violence" was that of witness Shellenberg, who was improperly allowed to "give her opinion" despite the fact the State explicitly called her as a non-expert.

In fact, Shellenberg herself admitted on cross-examination that she was not qualified to diagnose petitioner as an SVP. The erroneous admission of her extensive opinion testimony mandates reversal here. Compare e.g. State v. Ellis, 345 S.C. 175, 547 S.E.2d 490 (2001) (improper non-expert opinion testimony which goes to the heart of the case is not harmless).

CONCLUSION

The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the jury verdict here. We therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings.

REVERSED AND REMANDED

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Henderson v Bryant

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4-4-15 Illinois:

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

Henderson v Bryant

This case has unbelievable conditions of release tied to the fellow, and the court sees that as well as the fellow obviously doesn't know how to present his issues to the court, so the court sends this back to the lower court with instructions to appoint him a lawyer to properly address his issues to the court. Finally this is NOT a decision that can be cited according to the court. i.e. NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION.

Here goes w/highlights:

Willie Henderson, designated a sexually violent person under Illinois' Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act, 725 ILCS 207/1-99, has been civilly committed to a treatment facility for much of the past 15 years.

In 2013 Henderson was briefly released from physical custody and placed on conditional release, during which he was required to abide by 55 separate "Conditions of Release." He was recommitted to the state's custody three months later.

In this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, he alleges that many of the conditions violated his constitutional rights, that his conditional-release agent and others abused him, and that he has been unlawfully recommitted.

The district court dismissed Henderson's case for lack of a valid claim. We vacate the dismissal in part because the court should have allowed one aspect of the case to move forward.

The sequence of events begins in July 2013, when Henderson was placed on conditional release. See 725 ILCS § 207/40(3)-(5). Among the 55 conditions of release, Henderson was ordered that he must:

• "[r]efrain from entering into a relationship of any type without written approval . . . any unauthorized relationships will be terminated immediately, including but not limited to relationships with family members;"
• "refrain from watching out any/all windows of residence for sexual gratification or any other reason;"
• "not purchase any items of any kind unless authorized;"
• "[r]efrain from entering anyone's motor vehicle and/or travelling with anyone in their vehicle without prior identification and approval;"
• "[n]ot establish a dating, intimate, or sexual relationship with a person" without prior approval;
• "[n]ot have photos or pictures of any child including your own in your home or in your control" without approval;
• "[n]either possess or have under your control any material that is pornographic, sexually oriented, or sexually stimulating, or that depicts or alludes to adult sexual activity or depicts minors under the age of 18, including but not limited to visual, auditory, telephonic, electronic media, or any matter obtained through access to the internet, access to any computer or material linked to computer access use;"
• and "[r]efrain from owning or having in your possession any animal of any type . . .
• refrain from babysitting or watching another person's pet or animal at any time."

After three months his conditional release was revoked and Henderson was recommitted (presumably pursuant to a state court order for violating a condition, see id. § 207/40(4)), precipitating this suit.

He sued Steve Bryant, the director of Liberty Healthcare (the corporation that operates the conditional-release program for sexually violent persons in Illinois), Nathan Rosato, his conditional-release agent, and Rhonda Meacham, his therapist.

Henderson contends generally that the terms of conditional release are overbroad, the defendants enforced those terms unreasonably, and he should not have been recommitted.

He elaborates that, while he was on release, the defendants prevented him from contacting his family and confiscated his family pictures; Rosato entered with his own key and searched Henderson's apartment unannounced while he was sleeping at night or showering; and both Rosato and Meacham verbally abused him in public.

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Jumping to Conclusion. Just unbelievable.
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The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part, and REMANDED for proceedings consistent with this order. As it did before, the district court may consider recruiting experienced counsel to assist Henderson with these claims.

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