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Showing posts with label ( Denial of Treatment. Show all posts
Showing posts with label ( Denial of Treatment. Show all posts

Merryfield v State

10-22-2010 Kansas:

Merryfield v State


For more than a decade, Dustin Merryfield has been confined at the Larned State Hospital under the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act, K.S.A. 59-29a01 et seq. He has filed a habeas-corpus petition under K.S.A. 60-1501 raising claims that go to the core of the Kansas treatment program for sexual predators: Merryfield claims that the program is run so poorly that it doesn't offer a realistic opportunity to cure or improve the mental abnormality for which he has been involuntarily confined. We must reverse the district court summary dismissal of Merryfield's petition because it raises constitutional claims of potential merit.

We also reverse the district court's decision refusing to appoint counsel to represent Merryfield in this habeas action
. While there is no general right to counsel in civil habeas cases, the constitutionality of the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act depends upon the procedural rights given to those who are involuntarily committed under its provisions.

The Kansas Legislature has explicitly provided a right to counsel to such persons during annual review hearings and has explicitly provided a right to counsel in K.S.A. 60-1501 proceedings to those involuntarily committed under other similar statutes.

We therefore conclude that in the case of habeas actions brought by persons confined pursuant to the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act, those persons have a constitutional right to counsel if the district court determines that their petitions cannot be summarily dismissed.

Lawsuit: Van Orden v Meyers

2-10-2015 Missouri:

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs' motion (Doc. No. 345) to reconsider the Court's October 17, 2014 Memorandum and Order (Doc. No. 338) granting Defendants' motion to dismiss with respect to Plaintiffs' cruel and unusual punishment and double jeopardy claims. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs' motion shall be denied.

BACKGROUND

This class action, filed by civilly committed residents of the Missouri Department of Mental Health's Sexual Offender Rehabilitation and Treatment Services ("SORTS") facilities, raises constitutional and statutory challenges regarding
  • (1) the care and treatment, or lack thereof, provided to SORTS residents by state officials; and
  • (2) the state's statutory scheme requiring reimbursement from SORTS residents for the costs of their allegedly inadequate care and treatment.

On October 17, 2014, the Court granted in part and denied in part Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' fifth amended complaint (the "complaint"). Plaintiffs' complaint asserted several 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims, and an alternative claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq.

Specifically, Plaintiffs challenged their care and treatment at SORTS on substantive due process, cruel and unusual punishment, double jeopardy, and ADA grounds; and they challenged the state's reimbursement scheme on substantive due process, equal protection, procedural due process, unreasonable seizure of property, and ex post facto grounds.

The Court held that Plaintiffs' complaint stated substantive due process and ADA claims for lack of adequate care and treatment, and substantive due process and equal protection claims for unlawful reimbursement. (Doc. No. 338.)

However, the Court dismissed Plaintiffs' other claims.

With respect to Plaintiffs' cruel and unusual punishment and double jeopardy claims, the Court held that, because Plaintiffs are civilly, rather than criminally, committed, their inadequate care and treatment allegations should be addressed under the Due Process Clause, rather than the Cruel and Unusual Punishment or Double Jeopardy Clauses, of the U.S. Constitution. Id. Plaintiffs challenge that ruling in their motion for reconsideration.

According to Plaintiffs, SORTS is a prison disguised as a mental health facility, and its purpose is to punish, not treat. Plaintiffs argue that the punitive nature of SORTS brings Plaintiffs' claims within the scope of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment and Double Jeopardy Clauses.

... ... ... ...
... ... ... ...

CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, and those stated in the Court's October 17, 2014 Memorandum and Order (Doc. No. 338), the Court finds that Plaintiffs' allegations regarding Defendants' implementation of the Missouri SVP statute, and the conditions of Plaintiffs' confinement thereunder, state valid due process claims, but not cruel and unusual punishment or double jeopardy claims.

Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration is DENIED. (Doc. No. 345.)

..Full Decision HERE.. ..

Bell v Caskey


3-31-2014 Illinois:

Bell v Caskey

Plaintiff Timothy Bell, proceeding pro se from his detention in the Rushville Treatment and Detention Center ("Rushville"), seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis on his claims against Defendants Herbert and Irina Caskey, the co-owners of Liberty Mental Health Corporation. ....

Bell alleges that, after completing his prison sentence on March 6, 2006, he was detained as a sexually violent person by the Illinois Department of Human Services. On July 27, 2007, a jury found Bell to be a sexually violent person pursuant to Illinois law, and he was subsequently housed in Rushville.

Bell claims that, since being placed in Rushville, he has not received any treatment for his condition. Bell alleges that the Liberty Mental Health Corporation ("Liberty") maintains a contract with the Illinois Department of Human Services to provide sex offender treatment to Rushville's residents, but Liberty has failed to provide any such treatment. Bell has sued Liberty's owners, Herbert Caskey and Irina Caskey, for violating his Constitutional rights by failing to provide sex offender treatment to him. ....

The Court finds that Bell's Complaint states a claim for violating his due process rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The United States Supreme Court has held that "due process requires that the conditions and duration of confinement under the Act bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which persons are committed." Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 265 (2001). The Supreme Court has also opined that involuntarily committed mentally retarded persons have a substantive due process right to "conditions of reasonable care and safety, reasonably nonrestrictive confinement conditions, and such training as may be required by these conditions." Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982).

... ... ...

In the instant case, Bell has alleged that the Caskeys maintain a contract with the State of Illinois and that they maintain a policy or custom of not providing treatment to Rushville residents. This allegation is sufficient to cause Defendants to become state actors for purposes of this initial merit review. King v. Chapman, ___ F. Supp. 2d ___, 2013 WL 6709623, * 20 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 16, 2013).

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis [2] is GRANTED. Pursuant to the Court's February 11, 2014 Order, no reduced filing fee will be assessed.

2. Pursuant to a review of the Complaint, the Court finds that Plaintiff states a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim against Defendants for failure to offer treatment during his confinement at Rushville. Any additional claim(s) shall not be included in the case except at the Court's discretion on motion by a party for good cause shown or pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15.

3. This case is now in the process of service. Plaintiff is advised to wait until counsel has appeared for Defendants before filing any motions in order to give Defendants notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before Defendants' counsel has filed an appearance will generally be denied as premature. Plaintiff need not submit any evidence to the Court at this time unless otherwise directed by the Court.

4. The Court will attempt service on Defendants by mailing each Defendant a waiver of service. Defendants have 60 days from service to file an Answer. If Defendants have not filed Answers or appeared through counsel within 60 days of the entry of this Order, Plaintiff may file a motion requesting the status of service. After counsel has appeared for Defendants, the Court will enter an Order scheduling deadlines for discovery and dispositive motions.

5. With respect to a Defendant who no longer works at the address provided by Plaintiff, the entity for whom that Defendant worked while at that address shall provide to the Clerk said Defendant's current work address, or, if not known, said Defendant's forwarding address. This information shall be used only for effectuating service. Documentation of forwarding addresses shall be retained only by the Clerk and shall not be maintained in the public docket nor disclosed by the Clerk.

6. Defendants shall file an Answer within 60 days of the date the waiver is sent by the clerk. A motion to dismiss is not an Answer. The Answer should include all defenses appropriate under the Federal Rules. The Answer and subsequent pleadings shall be to the issues and claims stated in this Order. In general, an answer sets forth Defendants' positions. The Court does not rule on the merits of those positions unless and until a motion is filed by Defendants. Therefore, no response to the Answer is necessary or will be considered.

7. Once counsel has appeared for a Defendant, Plaintiff need not send copies of his filings to that Defendant or to that Defendant's counsel. Instead, the Clerk will file Plaintiff's document electronically and send a notice of electronic filing to defense counsel. The notice of electronic filing shall constitute service on Defendants pursuant to Local Rule 5.3. If electronic service on Defendants is not available, Plaintiff will be notified and instructed accordingly.

8. Counsel for Defendants is hereby granted leave to depose Plaintiff at Plaintiff's place of confinement. Counsel for Defendants shall arrange the time for the deposition.

9. Plaintiff shall immediately notify the Court, in writing, of any change in his mailing address and telephone number. Plaintiff's failure to notify the Court of a change in mailing address or phone number will result in dismissal of this lawsuit with prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT THE CLERK IS DIRECTED TO: 1) SHOW PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS [2] AS GRANTED; 2) ATTEMPT SERVICE ON DEFENDANTS PURSUANT TO THE STANDARD PROCEDURES; AND 3) SET AN INTERNAL COURT DEADLINE 60 DAYS FROM THE ENTRY OF THIS ORDER FOR THE COURT TO CHECK ON THE STATUS OF SERVICE AND ENTER SCHEDULING DEADLINES.

LASTLY, IT IS ORDERED THAT IF A DEFENDANT FAILS TO SIGN AND RETURN A WAIVER OF SERVICE TO THE CLERK WITHIN 30 DAYS AFTER THE WAIVER IS SENT, THE COURT WILL TAKE APPROPRIATE STEPS TO EFFECT FORMAL SERVICE THROUGH THE U.S. MARHSAL'S SERVICE ON THAT DEFENDANT AND WILL REQUIRE THAT DEFENDANT TO PAY THE FULL COSTS OF FORMAL SERVICE PURSUANT TO FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 4(d)(2).

Walker v Jumper


8-18-2014 Illinois:

Walker v Jumper

Plaintiff Ronald D. Walker, proceeding pro se from his detention in the Rushville Treatment and Detention Center ("Rushville"), seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis on his claims against Defendants.

Walker alleges that he has been in the Illinois Department of Human Services' ("IDHS") custody since 2003. During this time, Walker alleges that he has received ineffective psychiatric treatment for his condition. In fact, Walker contends that his treatment has been so deficient that it amounts to no treatment at all. Without effective treatment, Walker cannot progress through the IDHS program and cannot be released from IDHS's custody.

Walker believes that Defendants' actions in this regard are purposeful because they and their employer, Liberty Healthcare, receive millions of taxpayer dollars to operate the IDHS facility at Rushville. Therefore, Defendants have an incentive to violate Walker's constitutional rights by refusing or failing to provide him with mental health treatment, thereby extending his confinement and continuing the flow of tax payer dollars. Accordingly, Walker has filed this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Defendants have and are violating his Fourteenth Amendment rights.

To the extent that Walker is averring that Defendants are violating his due process rights by providing him with mental health treatment and counseling that he disagrees with or that he believes is ineffective, Walker's Complaint fails to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has held that a detainee who is confined as a sexually dangerous person in Illinois does not have the right to receive an alternative treatment of his own choosing. Ambrose v. Godinez, 2013 WL 647292, * 2 (7th Cir. Feb. 22, 2013); Allison v. Snyder, 332 F.3d 1076 (7th Cir.2003)(sex offender group therapy does not violate privilege against self-incrimination or due process rights). Accordingly, Walker cannot proceed on a claim against Defendants that the treatment that he is receiving should be more narrowly tailored to meet his own, personal needs. Levi v. William, 2007 WL 2893647, * 1 (C.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2007)("Plaintiff states no constitutional claim about the group therapy or Defendants' refusal to provide individual therapy.").

However, giving Walker's Complaint a liberal reading, Walker could be alleging that Defendants have, essentially, failed to provide him with any mental health treatment whatsoever. To the extent that this is Walker's allegation, Walker's Complaint states a cause of action upon which relief can be granted.

The United States Supreme Court has held that "due process requires that the conditions and duration of confinement under the Act bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which persons are committed." Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 265 (2001). The Supreme Court has also opined that involuntarily committed mentally retarded persons have a substantive due process right to "conditions of reasonable care and safety, reasonably nonrestrictive confinement conditions, and such training as may be required by these conditions." Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982).

And, the Seventh Circuit has extended and summarized Youngerberg to include those individuals committed because they are sexually violent: "(a) committed persons are entitled to some treatment, and (b) what that treatment entails must be decided by mental-health professionals." Lane v. Williams, 689 F.3d 879, 882 (7th Cir. 2012)(internal quotation omitted). In other words, the Seventh Circuit has held that "Youngerberg holds that, under the due process clause, detainees are entitled to non-punitive programs designed using the exercise of professional judgment . . . ." Id. at 883.

... ... ...

Here, Walker has alleged that his treatment has been so defective that it amounts to having received no treatment whatsoever since being placed into the IDHS's custody. The Fourteenth Amendment requires that Walker receive some treatment. Therefore, Walker has stated a cause of action upon which relief can be granted.

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis [3] is GRANTED. This Court has instituted a reduced payment procedure for indigent plaintiffs who are institutionalized but who are not prisoners as defined in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h). A reduced payment is assessed of 50% of such plaintiff's average monthly income for the six months preceding the filing of the complaint but not to exceed the $350 filing fee. Income includes additions to the plaintiff's trust fund from any sources, including gifts. Although he has submitted an affidavit in support of his motion, Plaintiff has not submitted his trust fund ledgers so that the Court can determine the amount, if any, of his reduced payment. Accordingly, Plaintiff is directed to file, within fourteen days of the date of this Order, his trust fund ledgers for the six months preceding the filing of this suit so that the Court can determine the amount, if any, of his reduced payment. Failure to comply with the Court's Order could result in the Court denying Plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis.

2. Pursuant to a review of the Complaint, the Court finds that Plaintiff states a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim against Defendants for failure to offer treatment during his confinement with IDHS. Any additional claim(s) shall not be included in the case except at the Court's discretion on motion by a party for good cause shown or pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15.

3. This case is now in the process of service. Plaintiff is advised to wait until counsel has appeared for Defendants before filing any motions in order to give Defendants notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before Defendants' counsel has filed an appearance will generally be denied as premature. Plaintiff need not submit any evidence to the Court at this time unless otherwise directed by the Court.

4. The Court will attempt service on Defendants by mailing each Defendant a waiver of service. Defendants have 60 days from service to file an Answer. If Defendants have not filed Answers or appeared through counsel within 60 days of the entry of this Order, Plaintiff may file a motion requesting the status of service. After counsel has appeared for Defendants, the Court will enter an Order scheduling deadlines for discovery and dispositive motions.

5. With respect to a Defendant who no longer works at the address provided by Plaintiff, the entity for whom that Defendant worked while at that address shall provide to the Clerk said Defendant's current work address, or, if not known, said Defendant's forwarding address. This information shall be used only for effectuating service. Documentation of forwarding addresses shall be retained only by the Clerk and shall not be maintained in the public docket nor disclosed by the Clerk.

6. Defendants shall file an Answer within 60 days of the date the waiver is sent by the clerk. A motion to dismiss is not an Answer. The Answer should include all defenses appropriate under the Federal Rules. The Answer and subsequent pleadings shall be to the issues and claims stated in this Order. In general, an answer sets forth Defendants' positions. The Court does not rule on the merits of those positions unless and until a motion is filed by Defendants. Therefore, no response to the Answer is necessary or will be considered.

7. Once counsel has appeared for a Defendant, Plaintiff need not send copies of his filings to that Defendant or to that Defendant's counsel. Instead, the Clerk will file Plaintiff's document electronically and send a notice of electronic filing to defense counsel. The notice of electronic filing shall constitute service on Defendants pursuant to Local Rule 5.3. If electronic service on Defendants is not available, Plaintiff will be notified and instructed accordingly.

8. Counsel for Defendants is hereby granted leave to depose Plaintiff at Plaintiff's place of confinement. Counsel for Defendants shall arrange the time for the deposition.

9. Plaintiff shall immediately notify the Court, in writing, of any change in his mailing address and telephone number. Plaintiff's failure to notify the Court of a change in mailing address or phone number will result in dismissal of this lawsuit with prejudice.

It is further ORDERED that the Clerk is directed to: (1) show Plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis [3] as granted; (2) attempt service on Defendants' pursuant to the standard procedures; and (3) set an internal Court deadline 60 days from the entry of this Order for the Court to check on the status of service and enter scheduling deadlines.

Lastly, it is ORDERED that, if a Defendant fails to sign and return a waiver of service to the Clerk within 30 days after the waiver is sent, the Court will take appropriate steps to effect formal service through the U.S. Marshal's Service on that Defendant and will require that Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(2).

Carpenter v Clayton


3-17-2015 Illinois:

Carpenter v Clayton

Plaintiff proceeds pro se on this civil rights case regarding Plaintiff's access to mental health treatment and sex offender treatment at the Rushville Treatment and Detention Center. His claims are: (1) Defendants refused or delayed in providing sex offender treatment to Plaintiff after he consented to that treatment; (2) Defendants refused to assign Plaintiff a therapist; and, (3) Defendants failed to have an adequate procedure for Plaintiff to obtain help during a mental health crisis Plaintiff allegedly experienced when a resident on his unit committed suicide. (Judge Myerscough's 2/29/13 order, d/e 7.) The defendants are involved in Plaintiff's mental health treatment. This case is not about retaliation against Plaintiff for Plaintiff's exercise of his First Amendment rights: that claim proceeds in another pending case before Judge Myerscough. Carpenter v. Clayton, et al., 13-CV-3073.

This case is now at the summary judgment stage, before this Court by the consent of the parties. After careful consideration of the parties' submissions, the Court concludes that Defendants' motion for summary judgment must be granted on all claims except the Plaintiff's claim about his delay in access to sex offender treatment after he consented to that treatment in September of 2011. The Court needs more information to make a determination on that claim. Accordingly, Defendants will be directed to file a supplemental motion for summary judgment.

... ... ...

IT IS ORDERED:

(1) Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted in part and denied in part (85). Summary judgment is denied, with leave to renew, on Plaintiff's claim about a delay in access to sex offender treatment after he consented to that treatment on September 19, 2011. Defendants' motion for summary judgment is otherwise granted.

(2) By April 30, 2015, Defendants shall file a supplemental motion for summary judgment on the remaining claim.

Mulder v Schuyler County Sheriff


3-12-2015 Illinois:

Mulder v Schuyler County Sheriff

Plaintiff is detained for treatment in the Rushville Treatment and Detention Center pursuant to the Illinois Sexually Violent Persons Act. He seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis.

Plaintiff is allegedly "one of the smaller residents at the facility," which, liberally construing his allegations, makes him more vulnerable to sexual harassment and assault by other detainees at the facility.

Plaintiff alleges that he has been forced to room with "other [sexually violent persons who] have all been diagnosed to lack volitional control and be predisposed to commit acts of violence and sexual violence." (Complaint, p. 4.) Plaintiff alleges that he has been sexually assaulted by two different roommates. When resident "E. Smith" roomed with Plaintiff at the beginning of this year, Smith allegedly made sexual advances and sexually touched Plaintiff. After Plaintiff complained, Plaintiff was roomed with resident David Mackel, who also made sexual advances to Plaintiff, grabbed Plaintiff's genitals, and "tr[ied] to force [Plaintiff] into more and more sexual contacts." (Complaint p. 6.)

One day in August, 2014, Defendant Morton loudly told Plaintiff in front of the entire housing unit, "If you were not up all night sucking dick, you wouldn't be so tired now." (Complaint p. 5.) Morton's comment allegedly perpetuated and encouraged the continued sexual harassment of Plaintiff by resident Mackel and other residents on the unit. Plaintiff told Defendants Ganz, Schroeder, and Louck about Defendant Morton's comment, but nothing was done.

Plaintiff complained to Defendants Clayton, Hankins, Pennock, Kulhan, Dougherty, Parsons, Rose, Billingsley, Kindhart, Teel, Thomas, Louck, Morton, Schroeder, Ganz, Jumper, Clark, and Deeds about resident Mackel's abuse and harassment. None of these Defendants did anything until August 22, 2014, when Plaintiff was moved to a segregation cell called "special management." While Plaintiff was in segregation, resident Morales slipped a note under Plaintiff's door offering Plaintiff cash in return for sexually abusing Plaintiff. Plaintiff turned the note into security.

Defendant Clayton, who was supposed to be investigating Plaintiff's complaints about the sexual harassment, instead allegedly threatened to have Plaintiff put in jail on false charges if Plaintiff tried to press criminal charges against resident Mackel. Clayton also allegedly told Plaintiff that Plaintiff deserved what he got because Plaintiff is a "`faggot.'" (Complaint p. 7.)

As a result of the constant sexual harassment, Plaintiff allegedly suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder—including the inability to function or sleep and constant hand-shaking for days. Defendants Ganz, Schroeder, Louck, and Jumper have refused to provide Plaintiff any mental health treatment for Plaintiff's post-traumatic stress disorder, telling Plaintiff that such treatment is not offered at the facility.

... ... ...

However, the Schuyler County Sheriff's Office will be dismissed as a Defendant because the Sheriff and Schuyler County do not operate the Rushville Treatment and Detention Center. Defendant Clayton's alleged threat to have the Sheriff put Plaintiff in jail did not come to fruition, and the Sheriff is not liable for Clayton's alleged misconduct.

IT IS ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff's petition to proceed in forma pauperis is granted (3). Pursuant to a review of the Complaint, the Court finds that Plaintiff states the following constitutional claims: 1) deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm; 2) deliberate indifference to a serious need for mental health treatment; and 3) retaliation for Plaintiff's exercise of his First Amendment rights. This case proceeds solely on the claims identified in this paragraph. Any additional claims shall not be included in the case, except at the Court's discretion on motion by a party for good cause shown or pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15.

2. This case is now in the process of service. Plaintiff is advised to wait until counsel has appeared for Defendants before filing any motions, in order to give Defendants notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before Defendants' counsel has filed an appearance will generally be denied as premature. Plaintiff need not submit any evidence to the Court at this time, unless otherwise directed by the Court.

3. The Court will attempt service on Defendants by sending each Defendant a waiver of service. Defendants have 60 days from the date the waiver of service is sent to file an Answer. If Defendants have not filed Answers or appeared through counsel within 90 days of the entry of this order, Plaintiff may file a motion requesting the status of service. After counsel has appeared for Defendants, the Court will enter a scheduling order setting deadlines for discovery and dispositive motions.

4. With respect to a Defendant who no longer works at the address provided by Plaintiff, the entity for whom that Defendant worked while at that address shall provide to the Clerk said Defendant's current work address, or, if not known, said Defendant's forwarding address. This information shall be used only for effectuating service. Documentation of forwarding addresses shall be retained only by the Clerk and shall not be maintained in the public docket nor disclosed by the Clerk.

5. Defendants shall file an answer within 60 days of the day the waiver of service is sent by the Clerk. A motion to dismiss is not an answer. The answer should include all defenses appropriate under the Federal Rules. The answer and subsequent pleadings shall be to the issues and claims stated in this Opinion.

6. Once counsel has appeared for a Defendant, Plaintiff need not send copies of his filings to that Defendant or to that Defendant's counsel. Instead, the Clerk will file Plaintiff's document electronically and send a notice of electronic filing to defense counsel. The notice of electronic filing shall constitute service on Defendants pursuant to Local Rule 5.3. If electronic service on Defendants is not available, Plaintiff will be notified and instructed accordingly.

7. Counsel for Defendants is hereby granted leave to depose Plaintiff at Plaintiff's place of confinement. Counsel for Defendants shall arrange the time for the deposition.

8. Plaintiff shall immediately notify the Court, in writing, of any change in his mailing address and telephone number. Plaintiff's failure to notify the Court of a change in mailing address or phone number will result in dismissal of this lawsuit, with prejudice.

9. If a Defendant fails to sign and return a waiver of service to the clerk within 30 days after the waiver is sent, the Court will take appropriate steps to effect formal service through the U.S. Marshal's service on that Defendant and will require that Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(2).

10. Plaintiff's petition to proceed in forma pauperis is granted (3).

11. Plaintiff's motion for status is denied as moot (6).

12. The Clerk is directed to enter the standard qualified protective order pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act.

13. Defendant "Schuyler County Sheriffs Police" is dismissed and terminated.

14. The Clerk is directed to attempt service on Defendants pursuant to the standard procedures.