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Showing posts with label .Illinois. Show all posts
Showing posts with label .Illinois. Show all posts

Childress v Hankins

1-8-2016 Illinois:

Plaintiff is civilly detained in the Rushville Treatment and Detention Center pursuant to the Illinois Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act, 725 ILCS 207/1, et seq. He alleges that he is a paraplegic, needing frequent daily catheterizations to empty his bladder, a wheelchair, a wheelchair-accessible room and toilet, grab bars by the toilet, and a shower seat. For years Plaintiff has allegedly received these accommodations, per order of the doctor on site.

On June 18, 2015, Plaintiff was allegedly removed from his room and placed in a segregation cell without the necessary accommodations or any written notice of any rules he had broken. Handcuffs were allegedly placed too tightly on Plaintiff intentionally during the transport, and Plaintiff was wheeled to segregation in an aggressive manner intended to frighten him.

All of the Defendants allegedly ignored Plaintiff's pleas for a room that would accommodate his medical condition, remarking that Plaintiff should have thought of that before pursuing lawsuits against them. For six days Plaintiff was allegedly kept in the cell with no way to safely use the toilet or to clean himself. He was not permitted to send out any correspondence, including legal mail. He was allegedly forced to sit and lay in his own urine and feces, with no change of clothes, soap, toothpaste, toothbrush, or other necessities during this entire time.

Hughes v Farris

12-7-2015 Illinois:

Hughes v Farris

Michael Hughes alleges that an employee of the facility where he is civilly committed abused him because he is a homosexual; another employee suspended his treatment for complaining about it.

He is confined at the Treatment and Detention Facility in Rushville, Illinois, as a result of his designation as a sexually violent person for purposes of Illinois's Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act, 725 ILCS 207/1-99.

Invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Hughes sued Michael Farris, the supervisor of the laundry, and Krista Wilcoxen, Rushville's rehabilitation director. After interviewing Hughes at a "merit-review" hearing and screening his complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the district court concluded that he had failed to state a claim and dismissed the case. We vacate that judgment and remand.

Without vouching for anything, we recount the allegations in Hughes's complaint and, where consistent with the complaint, in his related filings. See Flying J Inc. v. City of New Haven, 549 F.3d 538, 542 n.1 (7th Cir. 2008).

Powers v Block

10-27-2015 Illinois:

Powers v Block

Powers' Complaint states a claim for violating his due process rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Brown v. Budz, 398 F.3d 904, 910 (7th Cir. 2005). The United States Supreme Court has held that "due process requires that the conditions and duration of confinement under the Act bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which persons are committed." Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 265 (2001). The Supreme Court has also opined that involuntarily committed mentally challenged persons have a substantive due process right to "conditions of reasonable care and safety, reasonably nonrestrictive confinement conditions, and such training as may be required by these conditions." Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982).

The Seventh Circuit has extended and summarized Youngerberg to include those individuals committed because they are sexually violent: "(a) committed persons are entitled to some treatment, and (b) what that treatment entails must be decided by mental-health professionals." Lane v. Williams, 689 F.3d 879, 882 (7th Cir. 2012)(internal quotation omitted). In other words, the Seventh Circuit has held that "Youngerberg holds that, under the due process clause, detainees are entitled to non-punitive programs designed using the exercise of professional judgment. . . ." Id. at 883.

Here, Powers has alleged that his treatment at Rushville has been so minimal and so inadequate that it has violated his Due Process Rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Fourteenth Amendment requires that Powers receive some treatment. Powers has alleged that he is, essentially, not receiving any. Therefore, Powers has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted against Defendants Jennifer Block, Gerrold Carreon, Shan Jumper, and Liberty Health Care Corporation.

In addition, Powers has alleged that Defendants Block, Carreon, Jumper, and Paula Lodge have retaliated against him because he has previously filed grievances and lawsuits against them and others at Rushville. Specifically, Powers contends that Defendants have threatened him, removed privileges, and withheld treatment because he has filed grievances and lawsuits. As such, Powers has stated a retaliation claim in violation of his First Amendment rights.

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED:

Lane v Williams


5-25-2010 Illinois:

Lane v Williams: The plaintiffs were convicted of sex crimes and completed their sentences years ago, but they remain in state custody as civil detainees pursuant to Illinois' Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act, 725 ILCS 207/1-99. Proceeding pro se, and then with the assistance of appointed counsel, the plaintiffs asserted a variety of claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging constitutional problems with the conditions of their confinement at Rushville Treatment and Detention Center. On appeal, only two issues remain:
  • (1) whether due process requires input from health professionals prior to restricting opportunities for in-person association among Rushville's six 75-person units and
  • (2) whether the First Amendment entitles detainees to use the facility's internal mail system instead of the U.S. mail to exchange letters with other detainees.
The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the nonmovant, and drawing all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Kuhn v. Goodlow, 678 F.3d 552, 555 (7th Cir.2012). Summary judgment is appropriate "when the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a)). We affirm.

The Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act authorizes detention of individuals who have been adjudicated a "sexually violent person" or "SVP," which requires, among other things, evidence that the person "suffers from a mental disorder that makes it substantially probable that the person will engage in acts of sexual violence." 725 ILCS 207/5(f). Civil commitment of this sort lasts until the detainee is "no longer a sexually violent person." 725 ILCS 207/40(a). Commitment under the Act is civil and so may be for purposes such as incapacitation and treatment, but not punishment. See, e.g., Allison v. Snyder, 332 F.3d 1076, 1079 (7th Cir.2003). And, as a general matter, "[p]ersons who have been involuntarily committed are entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions of confinement are designed to punish." Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321-22, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982).

The plaintiffs do not allege that they are being unconstitutionally punished, but, as mentioned, that their constitutional rights are nonetheless violated by the limitations imposed on their ability to interact with other detainees, in-person and by letter. These claims appear to be a product of the plaintiffs' dissatisfaction with Rushville's basic setup. Before Rushville, where Illinois' SVP population moved in 2006, SVPs were held at a facility in Joliet that allowed them to mix more freely. Even if that helps us understand the plaintiffs' claims, that contrast is not material; the issues before us concern the current situation at Rushville.

... ... ...

The parties disagree about the legal standard applicable to this First Amendment claim. The defendants suggest, implausibly, that the plaintiffs would be entitled to an injunction only if Rushville's mail policy shocks the conscience by, for instance, inflicting punishment. The plaintiffs recommend that we apply the standard set out in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987): "when a prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." The plaintiffs recognize that this standard is used for prisoners' claims, and so believe that a less stringent standard should apply to them as civil detainees, but they do not think we need to articulate that less stringent standard because, as they see it, they win under Turner. That is the standard the district court applied, and it is the standard that other district courts in this circuit have applied to constitutional claims by civil detainees. Smego v. Ashby, No. 10-CV-3240, 2011 WL 6140661, at *3 (C.D.Ill. Dec. 9, 2011); Hedgespeth v. Bartow, No. 09-cv-246, 2010 WL 2990897, at *6 (W.D.Wis. July 27, 2010).

Because Turner tells courts to consider the challenged regulation in relation to the government's legitimate interests, it would not be too difficult to adapt its standard for claims by civil detainees. To do so, courts would only have to recognize the different legitimate interests that governments have with regard to prisoners as compared with civil detainees. In this appeal, however, we do not have to decide whether and, if so, how to make such an adjustment to the Turner standard. Any standard that we would apply, including Turner, would require that the challenged policy at least "impinge" on the detainees' constitutional rights. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 89, 107 S.Ct. 2254. Here, there is no impingement, but only a demand for a better way to communicate with detainees outside their units — a way better than the U.S. mail. There is, after all, a system in place for communication among staff and for detainee communication with staff, and the plaintiffs see no reason that they should not be allowed to use that system for their own purposes. But that is nothing more than a recommendation for the officials at Rushville to consider — a suggestion about how operations at the facility could be improved; it does not state a constitutional claim. As maligned as the United States Postal Service may be, there is no First Amendment right to a means of sending letters superior to the one it provides.

AFFIRMED. ...To read the full opinion... by 7th Circuit Court of Appeals

Henderson v Bryant


4-4-15 Illinois:

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

Henderson v Bryant
This case has unbelievable conditions of release tied to the fellow, and the court sees that as well as the fellow obviously doesn't know how to present his issues to the court, so the court sends this back to the lower court with instructions to appoint him a lawyer to properly address his issues to the court. Finally this is NOT a decision that can be cited according to the court. i.e. NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION.

Here goes w/highlights:

Willie Henderson, designated a sexually violent person under Illinois' Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act, 725 ILCS 207/1-99, has been civilly committed to a treatment facility for much of the past 15 years.

In 2013 Henderson was briefly released from physical custody and placed on conditional release, during which he was required to abide by 55 separate "Conditions of Release." He was recommitted to the state's custody three months later.

In this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, he alleges that many of the conditions violated his constitutional rights, that his conditional-release agent and others abused him, and that he has been unlawfully recommitted.

The district court dismissed Henderson's case for lack of a valid claim. We vacate the dismissal in part because the court should have allowed one aspect of the case to move forward.

The sequence of events begins in July 2013, when Henderson was placed on conditional release. See 725 ILCS § 207/40(3)-(5). Among the 55 conditions of release, Henderson was ordered that he must:
  • "[r]efrain from entering into a relationship of any type without written approval . . . any unauthorized relationships will be terminated immediately, including but not limited to relationships with family members;"
  • "refrain from watching out any/all windows of residence for sexual gratification or any other reason;"
  • "not purchase any items of any kind unless authorized;"
  • "[r]efrain from entering anyone's motor vehicle and/or travelling with anyone in their vehicle without prior identification and approval;"
  • "[n]ot establish a dating, intimate, or sexual relationship with a person" without prior approval;
  • "[n]ot have photos or pictures of any child including your own in your home or in your control" without approval;
  • "[n]either possess or have under your control any material that is pornographic, sexually oriented, or sexually stimulating, or that depicts or alludes to adult sexual activity or depicts minors under the age of 18, including but not limited to visual, auditory, telephonic, electronic media, or any matter obtained through access to the internet, access to any computer or material linked to computer access use;"
  • and "[r]efrain from owning or having in your possession any animal of any type . . .
  • refrain from babysitting or watching another person's pet or animal at any time."

After three months his conditional release was revoked and Henderson was recommitted (presumably pursuant to a state court order for violating a condition, see id. § 207/40(4)), precipitating this suit.

He sued Steve Bryant, the director of Liberty Healthcare (the corporation that operates the conditional-release program for sexually violent persons in Illinois), Nathan Rosato, his conditional-release agent, and Rhonda Meacham, his therapist.

Henderson contends generally that the terms of conditional release are overbroad, the defendants enforced those terms unreasonably, and he should not have been recommitted.

He elaborates that, while he was on release, the defendants prevented him from contacting his family and confiscated his family pictures; Rosato entered with his own key and searched Henderson's apartment unannounced while he was sleeping at night or showering; and both Rosato and Meacham verbally abused him in public.

... ... ...
Jumping to Conclusion. Just unbelievable.
... ... ...

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part, and REMANDED for proceedings consistent with this order. As it did before, the district court may consider recruiting experienced counsel to assist Henderson with these claims.

In re Commitment of Alger: State of Wisconsin -v- Michael Alger


July 2015 Illinois:

In re Commitment of Alger: State of Wisconsin -v- Michael Alger

Michael Alger appeals an order denying his 2014 petition for discharge from his WIS. STAT. ch. 980 commitment.[1] The circuit court concluded Alger's petition was insufficient to set the matter for trial because Alger had refused to participate in treatment following his previous discharge trial in 2012, wherein a jury found Alger remained dangerous within the meaning of WIS. STAT. § 980.01(7).

¶2 However, the basis for Alger's petition was not that his condition had improved as a result of treatment. Rather, Alger's petition was supported with an expert report applying new research regarding the proper use of one of the actuarial instruments utilized by the experts at Alger's prior discharge trial.

Applying this new research, the report concluded Alger no longer met the criteria for commitment
under WIS. STAT. ch. 980. This expert's report was not prepared at Alger's behest, but rather was submitted pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 980.07(2), as a component of the Department of Health Service's (DHS) statutorily mandated, annual reexamination of Alger.

¶3 Based upon this shift in the relevant professional understanding regarding the evaluation of a person's dangerousness, a fact finder "would likely conclude [Alger's] condition has changed since the most recent order denying a petition for discharge" such that Alger "no longer meets the criteria for commitment as a sexually violent person." See WIS. STAT. § 980.09(1).

Accordingly, we reverse and remand with directions for the circuit court to conduct a discharge trial.

... ... ...

Dr. Subramanian opined that recent research indicated that static and dynamic factors, considered in combination, "offer unique variance in assessing sexual recidivism risk." Specifically, Subramanian cited a 2011 research presentation that "assessed sexual recidivism using the Static-99R as a static instrument and Violence Risk Scale — Sex Offender Version (VRS-SO), Structured Risk Assessment — Forensic Version (SRA-FV), and Stable — 2007 as instruments to assess dynamic risk factors and presented results graphically." Subramanian also cited 2012 research presented at the Association of Treatment of Sexual Abusers that showed "[s]exual recidivism probabilities differed for nineteen samples based on dynamic factors external to Static-99R assessed by any one of the three instruments described above. Like the study in 2011, this research also concluded that dynamic factors accounted for the sample base rates."

Based on Alger's dynamic risk factors, which included substance abuse and intimacy deficits as the two main relevant factors, Dr. Subramanian concluded the recidivism probability estimates of the "Nonroutine" group best applied to Alger.[8] Subramanian scored Alger a "5" on the Static-99R. Individuals in the "Nonroutine" sample with a score of "5" had sexual recidivism rates of 20% in five years and 28% in ten years. Subramanian therefore concluded Alger's "lifetime probability [of] sexual offending does not exceed the legal threshold of fifty-one percent."

Davis -v- Wessell and Lay


July 2015 Illinois:

Davis -v- Wessell and Lay

Earl Sidney Davis, a civil detainee, sued security guards Seth Wessel and George Lay pursuant to the substantive component of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging Wessel and Lay refused to remove Davis's hand restraints while he used the restroom and then laughed as he struggled to unzip his pants and urinate. A jury found in favor of Davis and awarded him $1,000 in compensatory damages.

Wessel and Lay appeal, contending that the district court erred in instructing the jury and denying their motion for judgment as a matter of law. We vacate the judgment and remand for a new trial.

... ... ...

Davis is a civil detainee pursuant to the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act ("SVP Act"), 725 ILCS 207/1-207/99, in the custody of the Illinois Department of Human Services, and housed at its high-security Rushville Treatment and Detention Facility ("Facility"). The SVP Act permits a person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense to be civilly detained beyond his criminal sentence, possibly indefinitely but subject to periodic review, if he is found to be "dangerous" because he "suffers from a mental disorder that makes it substantially probable that [he] will engage in acts of sexual violence" in the future. 725 ILCS 207/5(f), 9, 40, 55. Wessel and Lay worked at the Facility as Security Therapy Aids, i.e., security guards.

Davis, then proceeding pro se, filed a complaint in district court under § 1983, alleging (as relevant here) that Wessel and Lay refused to remove his "black box" hand restraints while he used a restroom in a Madison County, Illinois courthouse, and watched and laughed as he struggled to unzip his pants, urinate, and zip his pants, which caused him psychological pain and physical pain in his wrists. After the district court denied Wessel and Lay's motion for summary judgment, the case proceeded to jury trial, with two law students representing Davis. (The law students, Daniel Campbell and Adam Hearn of the University of Illinois College of Law Federal Civil Rights Clinic, were provisionally admitted to practice as attorneys for the purposes of this case pursuant to Central District of Illinois Local Rule 83.5(A).)

... ... ...

Wessel and Lay take refuge behind the Facility directive that they maintain permitted them to remove restraints only "[w]ithin a secure facility in order to utilize the restroom." But there was conflicting testimony as to whether the corridor behind the courtroom was "secure." Moreover, the same directive allowed Wessel and Lay to call their supervisor for permission to remove the restraints, and a reasonable jury could find that they chose not to do so for the purpose of humiliating Davis.

It must be remembered that Davis would have had no means of escape from the windowless restroom other than by force through Wessel and Lay (while Davis still wore leg shackles), and Wessel and Lay were each considerably larger, younger, and healthier than Davis. And finally, even if the directive meant what Wessel and Lay contend, "[a] jail cannot shield a cruel and unusual punishment from legal challenge simply by imposing it on everyone equally. That would serve only to magnify the constitutional problem." King v. McCarty, 781 F.3d 889, 898-99 (7th Cir. 2015). The district court properly denied Wessel and Lay's motion for judgment as a matter of law.

CONCLUSION.
The judgment is VACATED and the case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

People v Dodds


2-27-2014 Illinois:

People v Dodds

This is an appeal from the circuit court's order dismissing a petition to vacate judgment filed by the defendant, Paul Dodds, pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2000)). The defendant, who was charged with four counts of possession of child pornography (720 ILCS 5/11-20.1(a)(1) (West 2000)), pleaded guilty to one count in exchange for a sentence of 18 months' probation and the requirement that he register as a sex offender for a period of 10 years.

Apparently, at the time of sentencing, defense counsel, the State and the trial judge all mistakenly believed that the defendant was required to register only for 10 years, rather than natural life, as required by the Illinois Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) (730 ILCS 150/7 (West 2000)).[1] After the 10 years expired, the defendant was informed that he would have to register as a sex offender for natural life.

The defendant then filed a section 2-1401 petition (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2000)) seeking to vacate his conviction and sentence. The defendant argued that: (1) his sentence was void because the trial court lacked the authority to impose a sentence not permitted by law; and (2) his guilty plea was involuntary because: (a) his counsel was ineffective and (b) the State breached its promise that the defendant be required to register only for 10 years, rather than natural life, thereby depriving the defendant of due process of law.

The State filed and the circuit court granted a motion to dismiss the defendant's petition pursuant to sections 2-615 and 2-619 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-615, 2-619 (West 2000)). The defendant now appeals that dismissal and asks this court to vacate his conviction and sentence. For the reasons that follow, we agree with the defendant, vacate his conviction and sentence and remand to the trial court with instructions.

... ... ...

32 Subsequent to Presley, our supreme court decided Hughes, 2012 IL 112817, affirmatively adopting the rationale in Padilla and applying it to a counsel's duty to advise a defendant of the possibility of involuntary commitment pursuant to the Illinois Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act (SVPCA) (725 ILCS 207/9 (West 2008)). In Hughes, a defendant who pleaded guilty to aggravated criminal sexual abuse filed a motion to vacate his plea after he was released from prison and the State filed a petition to have him declared a sexually violent person under the SVPCA. Hughes, 2012 IL 112817, ¶¶ 9-10. When the motion to vacate his plea was denied, the defendant appealed, arguing, inter alia, that under the United States Supreme Court decision in Padilla, his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered since his counsel never advised him that the plea could be used as a basis for filing a petition to have him declared a sexually violent person, subject to involuntary commitment. Hughes, 2012 IL 112817, ¶¶ 15-16. The appellate court affirmed, finding that traditionally the filing of a sexually violent person petition was a collateral consequence of the plea and that, therefore, the defendant had failed to establish that under Padilla counsel had a duty to advise him regrading the possibility of involuntary commitment. Hughes, 2012 IL 112817, ¶ 16.

¶ 33 Our supreme court disagreed and held that under Padilla, a counsel's failure to advise the defendant of the collateral consequence, i.e., the possibility that his plea would be used as a basis for the filing of a sexually violent person petition, rose to the level of ineffective performance of counsel. Hughes, 2012 IL 112817, ¶¶ 43-62.[6]

... ... ...

CONCLUSION

¶ 50 For all of the reasons stated above, we vacate the defendant's plea, conviction and sentence and remand to the circuit court for further proceedings before a different trial judge. In doing so, however, we remind the parties that they were unable to obtain the record from the underlying proceedings for purposes of this appeal, and that for this same reason, retrial may prove difficult.

¶ 51 Judgment vacated; reversed and remanded with instructions.

Smego v. Mitchell


2-27-2014 Illinois:

Smego v. Mitchell

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff Richard Smego, a civil detainee at the Rushville Treatment and Detention Center in Illinois, sued a dentist, two doctors, and a dental hygienist for violating his constitutional rights by acting with deliberate indifference to his serious dental problems. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants.

We conclude that Smego offered sufficient evidence for a jury to find that three of those defendants violated his constitutional rights, so we vacate the judgment in part and remand for further proceedings.

... ... ...

We reach the opposite conclusion regarding Dr. Lochard, who unlike Dr. Bednarz had examined Smego's painful teeth and cannot claim ignorance about the lack of treatment. The district court concluded that Dr. Lochard was entitled to defer all dental decisions to Dr. Mitchell. This belief that Dr. Lochard could meet his constitutional obligation to Smego simply by ignoring his untreated dental concerns is mistaken. Smego had told Dr. Lochard both that he was in pain and that he was unable to get necessary treatment from Dr. Mitchell. But unlike Dr. Bednarz, who investigated the problem by contacting Dr. Mitchell, there is no evidence in the record that Dr. Lochard ever contacted Dr. Mitchell, Dr. Bednarz, or Smego's therapist to see why Smego could not get dental care. That Dr. Lochard is not himself a dentist is beside the point; even non-medical personnel cannot stand by and ignore a detainee's complaints of serious medical issues. E.g., Berry, 604 F.3d at 441. Moreover, Dr. Lochard did not defer entirely to Dr. Mitchell. He prescribed Motrin despite the availability of substitutes and knowledge of Smego's allergy. A physician is deliberately indifferent when he persists in an ineffective treatment — and prescribing painkillers that cause a patient to experience pain certainly meets this standard — for a serious condition. See Gonzalez v. Feinerman, 663 F.3d 311, 314 (7th Cir.2011); Arnett, 658 F.3d at 754.

Accordingly, we VACATE the grant of summary judgment in favor of Dr. Mitchell, Ms. Lawshea, and Dr. Lochard and REMAND the case for further proceedings on Smego's claim of deliberate indifference against those defendants. In all other respects we AFFIRM the judgment.

Smego v. Payne


3-21-2012 Illinois:

Smego v. Payne

Richard Smego, a civilly committed sex offender, see 725 ILCS 207/1-99, appeals from the grant of summary judgment for the defendants in this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Smego is confined at the treatment center in Rushville, Illinois, and claims that the facility director and four other current or former members of the staff deprived him of adequate medical care and retaliated when he complained.

We conclude that a jury reasonably could decide that three of the defendants, all of them responsible for treating the mental disorder that prompted Smego's commitment to Rushville, violated his constitutional rights by causing vital treatment to be discontinued.

We thus vacate the judgment in favor of those defendants and remand for further proceedings.

... ... ...

There is sufficient evidence in this record for a jury to find that, since mid-2009, the treatment that is essential to Smego's hopes of eventual release from Rushville has been at a standstill because of the actions of Jelinek, Payne, and Dr. Nwachukwu-Udaku.

The district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of these defendants is VACATED, and as to those defendants the case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this order. In all other respects the judgment is AFFIRMED.

Hughes v. Mitchell-Lawshea


6-29-2012 Illinois:

Hughes v. Mitchell-Lawshea

The four Plaintiffs in this action are detained in the Rushville Treatment and Detention Center and seek leave to proceed in forma pauperis. The "privilege to proceed without posting security for costs and fees is reserved to the many truly impoverished litigants who, within the District Court's sound discretion, would remain without legal remedy if such privilege were not afforded to them." Brewster v. North Am. Van Lines, Inc., 461 F.2d 649, 651 (7th Cir. 1972). Additionally, a court must dismiss cases proceeding in forma pauperis "at any time" if the action is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim, even if part of the filing fee has been paid. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)(2).

In reviewing the complaint, the Court accepts the factual allegations as true, liberally construing them in Plaintiffs' favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013). However, conclusory statements and labels are insufficient. Enough facts must be provided to "`state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.'" Alexander v. U.S., 721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013)(quoted cite omitted).

The Plaintiffs allege they are provided inadequate dental care at the Rushville facility and the Defendants have been deliberately indifferent to their serious dental conditions. Plaintiffs state Defendant Dr. Jacqueline Mitchell-Lawshea is the only dentist for all 600 residents, works only 15 hours a week, and leaves detainees to suffer without treatment. For instance, Plaintiff Michael Hughes says he submitted a Health Care Request (HCR) for a painful cavity which was diagnosed on June 29, 2014, but one year later, he still has not received treatment. Plaintiff Jeffrey Hargett says he filed an HCR regarding a painful hole in one of his teeth, but has never received treatment. Plaintiff Ronnie Brazzell filed a HCR regarding a painful cavity on October 27, 2013, but received no response for one year. Finally, Plaintiff Lawrence Hayes complained of constant pain from broken teeth, but it took several months to receive any response.

Dooley v. Kibby


5-18-2012 Illinois:

Dooley v. Kibby

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and currently detained in the Rushville Treatment and Detention Center, seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis on his claim of excessive force, inhumane conditions of confinement, and punishment without procedural due process.

...

Plaintiff is confined at the Rushville Treatment and Detention Center pursuant to the Illinois Sexually Violent Persons Act.

On or about July 9, 2011, Plaintiff was directed several times over the intercom to come to the kitchen and work. Plaintiff refused because it was his day off. Eventually, Defendant Haage came to Plaintiff's room and directed him to back up to the access hole in the door so that Plaintiff could be handcuffed. Plaintiff refused, and Haage called in an extraction team of six members.

Plaintiff capitulated when the extraction team arrived, backing up to the chuck hole with his hands behind him. After cuffs were placed, one of the extraction team members yanked the chain forcefully, pulling Plaintiff's hands up to his shoulders, causing "extensive damage" to Plaintiff's right hand. The incident was allegedly captured on video tape. The members of the extraction team were Defendants Chenoweth, Angel, Zimmerman, Keller, Teel, and Maloney.

Plaintiff was then forced to walk backwards to the health care unit and placed in a "glass jail cell." His clothes were torn off and the cell mattress was removed. For three days, the cell lacked operable plumbing or a mattress. Plaintiff was given only four squares of toilet paper on his third day.

Plaintiff was written a disciplinary report based on the incident, which apparently resulted in his segregation for thirty days. Plaintiff appears to be alleging that he did not receive adequate notice of the charges against him. He alleges that Defendant McAdory ordered the imposition of the segregation.

Brown v. McAdory


5-28-2015 Illinois:

Brown v. McAdory

Plaintiff proceeds pro se from his detention in the Rushville Treatment and Detention Center. His claims arise from his segregation between July 22-August 8, 2010, and again from March 24-April 4, 2011.

In Higgs v. Carver, 286 F.3d 437, 438 (7th Cir. 2002), the Seventh Circuit stated that "[a] pretrial detainee cannot be placed in segregation as a punishment for a disciplinary infraction without notice and an opportunity to be heard; due process requires no less." Defendants do not label the confinement Plaintiff experienced "segregation," but it effectively was.

Plaintiff was placed in an empty room by himself with nothing but the clothes on his back and, in the 2010 incident but not the 2011 incident, a mattress. He had no freedom of movement, no property, no hygiene supplies, and no change of clothes. His conditions were not like the mild punishment imposed on a Rushville resident in Miller v. Dobier, 634 F.3d 412 (7th Cir. 2011), as Defendants argue. The resident in Miller could leave his cell, have visitors, and have some property. Higgs clearly establishes that Plaintiff was entitled to due process before his placement in segregation. Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity.

On October 14, 2014, the Court denied summary judgment and identified the following claims for trial: (1) lack of procedural due process before Plaintiff's placement in what amounted to segregation cells; (2) a violation of Plaintiff's First Amendment rights to communicate while he was in those cells; and, (3) a claim that the conditions of the cells on both occasions deprived Plaintiff of basic necessities. The Court assumes familiarity with that opinion.

Before the Court are Defendants' supplemental summary judgment motions on the First Amendment and procedural due process claims.

... ... ...

IT IS ORDERED:

1. Defendants' supplemental motions for summary judgment are granted in part and denied in part (109, 110). Summary judgment is granted to Defendants on Plaintiff's First Amendment claims and on his procedural due process claims arising from the 2010 incident. The motions are otherwise denied.

2. Defendants' unopposed motion to compel is granted (102). Plaintiff is directed to respond to any outstanding discovery requests by June 1, 2015.

3. Attorney Daniel Noll is appointed as pro bono counsel to represent Plaintiff at the trial and in any further pretrial proceedings. Discovery will not be reopened.

4. A status conference is scheduled for June 12, 2015 at 2:00 p.m. to discuss whether the parties will consent to Magistrate Judge Schanzle-Haskins and to set a trial date. The final pretrial conference remains scheduled for July 8, 2015, at this point.

5. The clerk is directed to alert the pro bono coordinator of the appointment of pro bono counsel in this case.

6. The clerk is directed to issue a video writ to secure Plaintiff's presence at the status conference on June 12, 2015. Counsel shall appear in person.

Bell v Caskey


3-31-2014 Illinois:

Bell v Caskey

Plaintiff Timothy Bell, proceeding pro se from his detention in the Rushville Treatment and Detention Center ("Rushville"), seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis on his claims against Defendants Herbert and Irina Caskey, the co-owners of Liberty Mental Health Corporation. ....

Bell alleges that, after completing his prison sentence on March 6, 2006, he was detained as a sexually violent person by the Illinois Department of Human Services. On July 27, 2007, a jury found Bell to be a sexually violent person pursuant to Illinois law, and he was subsequently housed in Rushville.

Bell claims that, since being placed in Rushville, he has not received any treatment for his condition. Bell alleges that the Liberty Mental Health Corporation ("Liberty") maintains a contract with the Illinois Department of Human Services to provide sex offender treatment to Rushville's residents, but Liberty has failed to provide any such treatment. Bell has sued Liberty's owners, Herbert Caskey and Irina Caskey, for violating his Constitutional rights by failing to provide sex offender treatment to him. ....

The Court finds that Bell's Complaint states a claim for violating his due process rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The United States Supreme Court has held that "due process requires that the conditions and duration of confinement under the Act bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which persons are committed." Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 265 (2001). The Supreme Court has also opined that involuntarily committed mentally retarded persons have a substantive due process right to "conditions of reasonable care and safety, reasonably nonrestrictive confinement conditions, and such training as may be required by these conditions." Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982).

... ... ...

In the instant case, Bell has alleged that the Caskeys maintain a contract with the State of Illinois and that they maintain a policy or custom of not providing treatment to Rushville residents. This allegation is sufficient to cause Defendants to become state actors for purposes of this initial merit review. King v. Chapman, ___ F. Supp. 2d ___, 2013 WL 6709623, * 20 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 16, 2013).

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis [2] is GRANTED. Pursuant to the Court's February 11, 2014 Order, no reduced filing fee will be assessed.

2. Pursuant to a review of the Complaint, the Court finds that Plaintiff states a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim against Defendants for failure to offer treatment during his confinement at Rushville. Any additional claim(s) shall not be included in the case except at the Court's discretion on motion by a party for good cause shown or pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15.

3. This case is now in the process of service. Plaintiff is advised to wait until counsel has appeared for Defendants before filing any motions in order to give Defendants notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before Defendants' counsel has filed an appearance will generally be denied as premature. Plaintiff need not submit any evidence to the Court at this time unless otherwise directed by the Court.

4. The Court will attempt service on Defendants by mailing each Defendant a waiver of service. Defendants have 60 days from service to file an Answer. If Defendants have not filed Answers or appeared through counsel within 60 days of the entry of this Order, Plaintiff may file a motion requesting the status of service. After counsel has appeared for Defendants, the Court will enter an Order scheduling deadlines for discovery and dispositive motions.

5. With respect to a Defendant who no longer works at the address provided by Plaintiff, the entity for whom that Defendant worked while at that address shall provide to the Clerk said Defendant's current work address, or, if not known, said Defendant's forwarding address. This information shall be used only for effectuating service. Documentation of forwarding addresses shall be retained only by the Clerk and shall not be maintained in the public docket nor disclosed by the Clerk.

6. Defendants shall file an Answer within 60 days of the date the waiver is sent by the clerk. A motion to dismiss is not an Answer. The Answer should include all defenses appropriate under the Federal Rules. The Answer and subsequent pleadings shall be to the issues and claims stated in this Order. In general, an answer sets forth Defendants' positions. The Court does not rule on the merits of those positions unless and until a motion is filed by Defendants. Therefore, no response to the Answer is necessary or will be considered.

7. Once counsel has appeared for a Defendant, Plaintiff need not send copies of his filings to that Defendant or to that Defendant's counsel. Instead, the Clerk will file Plaintiff's document electronically and send a notice of electronic filing to defense counsel. The notice of electronic filing shall constitute service on Defendants pursuant to Local Rule 5.3. If electronic service on Defendants is not available, Plaintiff will be notified and instructed accordingly.

8. Counsel for Defendants is hereby granted leave to depose Plaintiff at Plaintiff's place of confinement. Counsel for Defendants shall arrange the time for the deposition.

9. Plaintiff shall immediately notify the Court, in writing, of any change in his mailing address and telephone number. Plaintiff's failure to notify the Court of a change in mailing address or phone number will result in dismissal of this lawsuit with prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT THE CLERK IS DIRECTED TO: 1) SHOW PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS [2] AS GRANTED; 2) ATTEMPT SERVICE ON DEFENDANTS PURSUANT TO THE STANDARD PROCEDURES; AND 3) SET AN INTERNAL COURT DEADLINE 60 DAYS FROM THE ENTRY OF THIS ORDER FOR THE COURT TO CHECK ON THE STATUS OF SERVICE AND ENTER SCHEDULING DEADLINES.

LASTLY, IT IS ORDERED THAT IF A DEFENDANT FAILS TO SIGN AND RETURN A WAIVER OF SERVICE TO THE CLERK WITHIN 30 DAYS AFTER THE WAIVER IS SENT, THE COURT WILL TAKE APPROPRIATE STEPS TO EFFECT FORMAL SERVICE THROUGH THE U.S. MARHSAL'S SERVICE ON THAT DEFENDANT AND WILL REQUIRE THAT DEFENDANT TO PAY THE FULL COSTS OF FORMAL SERVICE PURSUANT TO FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 4(d)(2).

Scott v Smith


3-31-2014 Illinois:

Scott v Smith

RULE 16.3 PRETRIAL PROCEDURES IN PRISONER AND DETAINEE CASES
The following procedures apply to civil cases filed by prisoners and civil detainees proceeding pro se. For purposes of this section, a “prisoner” is a person defined in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h). A “civil detainee” is a person held in detention or committed to civil law, including but not limited to persons detained or civilly committed pursuant to the Illinois Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act, 725 ILCS 207/1 et seq., or the Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act, 725 ILCS 205/0.01 et seq..

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Plaintiff Dennis Scott is a resident of Rushville Treatment and Detention Facility ("Rushville"). Plaintiff has been diagnosed with a medical condition that requires regular dialysis treatment. Typically, Plaintiff is scheduled to receive dialysis treatment on Monday, Wednesday, and Friday at 4 a.m. within the health care unit at Rushville. Plaintiff receives the treatment from Nurse Alice Ore ("Nurse Ore").

On Monday, March 25, 2013, inclement weather delayed Nurse Ore's arrival at Rushville. At approximately 8:00 a.m., Defendant Smith notified Plaintiff that Nurse Ore had arrived, and informed Plaintiff that he had ten (10) minutes to report for treatment. When Plaintiff arrived at the guard station, Defendant Smith refused to allow Plaintiff to leave the housing unit. Defendant Smith stated that Plaintiff had failed to report within ten (10) minutes of being called for treatment ("10-minute rule"). Therefore, Defendant Smith explained, Plaintiff would not be allowed to go to the health care unit. Plaintiff protested and informed Defendant Kerr, a supervisor on the day in question, that he was being denied his dialysis treatment. Defendant Kerr told Plaintiff that he would address Plaintiff's concerns when he returned from another unit. Defendant Kerr left the unit and never returned. Plaintiff did not receive dialysis treatment until Wednesday, March 27, 2013, five days after his previous treatment on Friday, March 22, 2013.

... ... ...

The Eighth Amendment proscription against cruel and unusual punishment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibit the denial of medical treatment for*77serious medical needs to those incarcerated within the prison system. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832. This right was clearly established on March 25, 2013. As discussed above, Plaintiff had a serious medical need that required treatment. A genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the Defendants were deliberately indifferent to those needs, and the Court cannot say that the complete denial of treatment to Plaintiff on the day in question was reasonable and consistent with the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity.IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that:

1) The Defendants' motion for summary judgment is denied pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. [17].
2) A status hearing is scheduled for March 26, 2015 at 1:45 p.m. .

The Plaintiff shall appear by video conference and the Defendants' attorney(s) shall appear in person before the court sitting in Urbana, Illinois. The clerk is to issue a writ for the Plaintiff's participation in the video conference. ..Source..

Walker v Scott


9-15-2015 Illinois:

Walker v Scott

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and civilly committed at Rushville Treatment and Detention Facility, brought the present lawsuit pursuant to the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based upon the refusal to provide Plaintiff with a diet that complied with his religious beliefs. The matter comes before the Court for ruling on the Defendants' respective motions for summary judgment (Docs. 26, 28).

Plaintiff is civilly committed at Rushville Treatment and Detention Facility ("Rushville" or "TDF"), and has been a member of the Islamic faith since 1987. As a Muslim, Plaintiff believes that he is "required to eat all of the things God commands [him] to eat." Pl. Dep. 58:1-4. This includes, among other things, meat prepared in accordance with Islamic law, and the avoidance of certain foods, including pork, foods contaminated with pork, and processed food products. Foods that meet these requirements are referred to as "Halal."

Plaintiff made several requests to be served a Halal diet to comply with the requirements of his faith. In the alternative, Plaintiff requested the Kosher diet served to Jewish residents as, according to his interpretation of the Koran and his own inquiry into the diet served at Rushville, Kosher and Halal diets were similar in both the types of foods allowed and the manner in which they are prepared.

These requests were denied on the following basis: "[Defendant] Billingsley [the Religious Coordinator] has spoken with several religious coordinators from other facilities and they indicate that the Kosher diet . . . [is] a direct violation of the Koran. The lacto vegan diet is what [Muslim inmates] receive in [the Illinois Department of Corrections]." (Doc. 29-5). Accordingly, Plaintiff was given a choice between being served the standard diet, which included those foods proscribed by Plaintiff's religious beliefs; and the lacto-ovo vegan or vegetarian diet ("vegetarian diet"), which lacks foods Plaintiff believes he is required to eat (Halal meat).

Plaintiff's requests for a Kosher diet were denied because he does not identify as a member of the Jewish faith. (Doc. 29-7).

... ... ...

For the reasons discussed above, genuine issues of material fact exist with regards to whether the Defendants' denial of Plaintiff's request for a religious diet violates Plaintiff's rights as enumerated under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act and the First Amendment. Therefore, the Defendants' motions for summary judgment are denied.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that:

1) Defendant Dredge's Motion for Summary Judgment [26] is DENIED. Defendants Scott, Billingsley, Blaesing, Houzenga, and Winters Motion for Summary Judgment [28] is GRANTED in part, and DENIED in part. Defendants' Motion [28] is GRANTED in full as to Defendant Winters, and DENIED as to all other Defendants. Clerk is directed to dismiss Defendant Winters with prejudice. Defendant Scott is dismissed with regard to Plaintiff's First Amendment Claims.

2) A final pretrial conference is scheduled for January 20, 2016 at 1:30 p.m.. The Plaintiff shall appear by video conference and the Defendants' attorney(s) shall appear in person before the court sitting in Springfield, Illinois. The clerk is to issue a writ for the Plaintiff's participation in the video conference.

3) The Court will send out proposed jury instructions and intends to ask the standard voir dire questions published on the Court's website (ilcd.uscourts.gov/local rules and orders/orders and rules by Judge/Judge Myerscough/General Voir Dire Procedure). By December 16, 2015, the parties shall file: 1) an agreed proposed pretrial order; 2) alternate or additional jury instructions (no duplicates); 3) motions in limine; and, (4) additional voir dire questions (not duplicative of the Court's). All proposed instructions shall be clearly marked, identifying the party, the number, and whether the instruction is additional or alternate (i.e., Pl.'s 1, additional; Pl.'s 2, alternate to Court's 3).

4) The Plaintiff and Defendants shall appear in person at trial. Residents of Rushville Treatment and Detention Facility who are not parties to this case shall appear by video conference and Rushville TDF employees who are not parties may also appear by video conference at trial. Other nonparty witnesses may appear by video at the court's discretion. Therefore, the proposed pretrial order must include: (1) the name, resident number and place of incarceration for each inmate to be called as a witness; (2) the name and place of employment for each Department of Human Services employee to be called as a witness; and, (3) the names and addresses of any witnesses who are not residents or employees for whom a party seeks a trial subpoena. The party seeking the subpoena must provide the necessary witness and mileage fees pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45.

5) A jury trial is scheduled for February 9, 2016 at 9:00 a.m. at the U.S. Courthouse in Springfield, Illinois. No writs to issue at this time.

Walker v Jumper


8-18-2014 Illinois:

Walker v Jumper

Plaintiff Ronald D. Walker, proceeding pro se from his detention in the Rushville Treatment and Detention Center ("Rushville"), seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis on his claims against Defendants.

Walker alleges that he has been in the Illinois Department of Human Services' ("IDHS") custody since 2003. During this time, Walker alleges that he has received ineffective psychiatric treatment for his condition. In fact, Walker contends that his treatment has been so deficient that it amounts to no treatment at all. Without effective treatment, Walker cannot progress through the IDHS program and cannot be released from IDHS's custody.

Walker believes that Defendants' actions in this regard are purposeful because they and their employer, Liberty Healthcare, receive millions of taxpayer dollars to operate the IDHS facility at Rushville. Therefore, Defendants have an incentive to violate Walker's constitutional rights by refusing or failing to provide him with mental health treatment, thereby extending his confinement and continuing the flow of tax payer dollars. Accordingly, Walker has filed this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Defendants have and are violating his Fourteenth Amendment rights.

To the extent that Walker is averring that Defendants are violating his due process rights by providing him with mental health treatment and counseling that he disagrees with or that he believes is ineffective, Walker's Complaint fails to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has held that a detainee who is confined as a sexually dangerous person in Illinois does not have the right to receive an alternative treatment of his own choosing. Ambrose v. Godinez, 2013 WL 647292, * 2 (7th Cir. Feb. 22, 2013); Allison v. Snyder, 332 F.3d 1076 (7th Cir.2003)(sex offender group therapy does not violate privilege against self-incrimination or due process rights). Accordingly, Walker cannot proceed on a claim against Defendants that the treatment that he is receiving should be more narrowly tailored to meet his own, personal needs. Levi v. William, 2007 WL 2893647, * 1 (C.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2007)("Plaintiff states no constitutional claim about the group therapy or Defendants' refusal to provide individual therapy.").

However, giving Walker's Complaint a liberal reading, Walker could be alleging that Defendants have, essentially, failed to provide him with any mental health treatment whatsoever. To the extent that this is Walker's allegation, Walker's Complaint states a cause of action upon which relief can be granted.

The United States Supreme Court has held that "due process requires that the conditions and duration of confinement under the Act bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which persons are committed." Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 265 (2001). The Supreme Court has also opined that involuntarily committed mentally retarded persons have a substantive due process right to "conditions of reasonable care and safety, reasonably nonrestrictive confinement conditions, and such training as may be required by these conditions." Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982).

And, the Seventh Circuit has extended and summarized Youngerberg to include those individuals committed because they are sexually violent: "(a) committed persons are entitled to some treatment, and (b) what that treatment entails must be decided by mental-health professionals." Lane v. Williams, 689 F.3d 879, 882 (7th Cir. 2012)(internal quotation omitted). In other words, the Seventh Circuit has held that "Youngerberg holds that, under the due process clause, detainees are entitled to non-punitive programs designed using the exercise of professional judgment . . . ." Id. at 883.

... ... ...

Here, Walker has alleged that his treatment has been so defective that it amounts to having received no treatment whatsoever since being placed into the IDHS's custody. The Fourteenth Amendment requires that Walker receive some treatment. Therefore, Walker has stated a cause of action upon which relief can be granted.

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis [3] is GRANTED. This Court has instituted a reduced payment procedure for indigent plaintiffs who are institutionalized but who are not prisoners as defined in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h). A reduced payment is assessed of 50% of such plaintiff's average monthly income for the six months preceding the filing of the complaint but not to exceed the $350 filing fee. Income includes additions to the plaintiff's trust fund from any sources, including gifts. Although he has submitted an affidavit in support of his motion, Plaintiff has not submitted his trust fund ledgers so that the Court can determine the amount, if any, of his reduced payment. Accordingly, Plaintiff is directed to file, within fourteen days of the date of this Order, his trust fund ledgers for the six months preceding the filing of this suit so that the Court can determine the amount, if any, of his reduced payment. Failure to comply with the Court's Order could result in the Court denying Plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis.

2. Pursuant to a review of the Complaint, the Court finds that Plaintiff states a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim against Defendants for failure to offer treatment during his confinement with IDHS. Any additional claim(s) shall not be included in the case except at the Court's discretion on motion by a party for good cause shown or pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15.

3. This case is now in the process of service. Plaintiff is advised to wait until counsel has appeared for Defendants before filing any motions in order to give Defendants notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before Defendants' counsel has filed an appearance will generally be denied as premature. Plaintiff need not submit any evidence to the Court at this time unless otherwise directed by the Court.

4. The Court will attempt service on Defendants by mailing each Defendant a waiver of service. Defendants have 60 days from service to file an Answer. If Defendants have not filed Answers or appeared through counsel within 60 days of the entry of this Order, Plaintiff may file a motion requesting the status of service. After counsel has appeared for Defendants, the Court will enter an Order scheduling deadlines for discovery and dispositive motions.

5. With respect to a Defendant who no longer works at the address provided by Plaintiff, the entity for whom that Defendant worked while at that address shall provide to the Clerk said Defendant's current work address, or, if not known, said Defendant's forwarding address. This information shall be used only for effectuating service. Documentation of forwarding addresses shall be retained only by the Clerk and shall not be maintained in the public docket nor disclosed by the Clerk.

6. Defendants shall file an Answer within 60 days of the date the waiver is sent by the clerk. A motion to dismiss is not an Answer. The Answer should include all defenses appropriate under the Federal Rules. The Answer and subsequent pleadings shall be to the issues and claims stated in this Order. In general, an answer sets forth Defendants' positions. The Court does not rule on the merits of those positions unless and until a motion is filed by Defendants. Therefore, no response to the Answer is necessary or will be considered.

7. Once counsel has appeared for a Defendant, Plaintiff need not send copies of his filings to that Defendant or to that Defendant's counsel. Instead, the Clerk will file Plaintiff's document electronically and send a notice of electronic filing to defense counsel. The notice of electronic filing shall constitute service on Defendants pursuant to Local Rule 5.3. If electronic service on Defendants is not available, Plaintiff will be notified and instructed accordingly.

8. Counsel for Defendants is hereby granted leave to depose Plaintiff at Plaintiff's place of confinement. Counsel for Defendants shall arrange the time for the deposition.

9. Plaintiff shall immediately notify the Court, in writing, of any change in his mailing address and telephone number. Plaintiff's failure to notify the Court of a change in mailing address or phone number will result in dismissal of this lawsuit with prejudice.

It is further ORDERED that the Clerk is directed to: (1) show Plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis [3] as granted; (2) attempt service on Defendants' pursuant to the standard procedures; and (3) set an internal Court deadline 60 days from the entry of this Order for the Court to check on the status of service and enter scheduling deadlines.

Lastly, it is ORDERED that, if a Defendant fails to sign and return a waiver of service to the Clerk within 30 days after the waiver is sent, the Court will take appropriate steps to effect formal service through the U.S. Marshal's Service on that Defendant and will require that Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(2).

Carpenter v Clayton


3-17-2015 Illinois:

Carpenter v Clayton

Plaintiff proceeds pro se on this civil rights case regarding Plaintiff's access to mental health treatment and sex offender treatment at the Rushville Treatment and Detention Center. His claims are: (1) Defendants refused or delayed in providing sex offender treatment to Plaintiff after he consented to that treatment; (2) Defendants refused to assign Plaintiff a therapist; and, (3) Defendants failed to have an adequate procedure for Plaintiff to obtain help during a mental health crisis Plaintiff allegedly experienced when a resident on his unit committed suicide. (Judge Myerscough's 2/29/13 order, d/e 7.) The defendants are involved in Plaintiff's mental health treatment. This case is not about retaliation against Plaintiff for Plaintiff's exercise of his First Amendment rights: that claim proceeds in another pending case before Judge Myerscough. Carpenter v. Clayton, et al., 13-CV-3073.

This case is now at the summary judgment stage, before this Court by the consent of the parties. After careful consideration of the parties' submissions, the Court concludes that Defendants' motion for summary judgment must be granted on all claims except the Plaintiff's claim about his delay in access to sex offender treatment after he consented to that treatment in September of 2011. The Court needs more information to make a determination on that claim. Accordingly, Defendants will be directed to file a supplemental motion for summary judgment.

... ... ...

IT IS ORDERED:

(1) Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted in part and denied in part (85). Summary judgment is denied, with leave to renew, on Plaintiff's claim about a delay in access to sex offender treatment after he consented to that treatment on September 19, 2011. Defendants' motion for summary judgment is otherwise granted.

(2) By April 30, 2015, Defendants shall file a supplemental motion for summary judgment on the remaining claim.

Brown v Phillips


9-14-2015 Illinois:

Brown v Phillips

Eugene Brown is civilly committed to the Rushville Treatment and Detention Center under Illinois's Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act. The Act authorizes detention of persons who are determined through a civil proceeding to be a "sexually violent person." See 725 ILCS 207/40. Brown and 17 others confined at Rushville sued the facility's officials and clinical staff under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. They allege that policies restricting their access to movies, video games, and video game consoles violate the First Amendment. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants, and only Brown appealed. Because the record does not contain a sufficient basis to conclude that the ban on movies and video games is reasonably related to the state's interests in security and rehabilitation, we vacate the judgment in part.

A "sexually violent person" includes someone who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense and "suffers from a mental disorder that makes it substantially probable that the person will engage in acts of sexual violence." 725 ILCS 207/5(f). Brown was convicted of five counts of aggravated sexual assault for raping adult women. See In re Commitment of Brown, No. 1-11-0732, 2012 WL 6962055, *1, *3-4 (Ill. App. Ct. Oct. 30, 2012). He was diagnosed with paraphilia (specifically, sexual attraction to non-consenting women) and personality disorder with antisocial and narcissistic traits. Id. at *4-5. If, as in Brown's case, a court or jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the person is sexually violent, he is committed to the custody of the Illinois Department of Human Services "for control, care and treatment until such time as the person is no longer a sexually violent person." 725 ILCS 207/5(a), 207/35(f), 207/40(a).

Before this lawsuit began, Rushville prohibited its residents from watching all R-rated movies and playing any M-rated video game. (The rating "M" for "mature" is defined by the Entertainment Software Rating Board as denoting material that is "generally suitable for ages 17 and up" and may "contain intense violence, blood and gore, sexual content and/or strong language." See ESRB Ratings Guide, ENTERTAINMENT SOFTWARE RATING BOARD, http://www.esrb.org/ratings/ratings_guide.jsp (last visited Sept. 3, 2015).)

After Brown sued to contend that these prohibitions violated the First Amendment, Rushville replaced its complete ban on all R and M-rated media with a list of banned movies and video games. In addition, after this suit began, Rushville discovered that two residents were using a video game console to access the internet to view forbidden material. So Rushville also banned residents from possessing video game consoles capable of accessing the internet. These new restrictions led Brown to contend that Rushville had retaliated against him for suing.

... ... ...

Accordingly, we VACATE the judgment with respect to Brown's challenge to the policy restricting his access to movies and video games, and REMAND for further proceedings.

Brown has abandoned his request for monetary damages, so the only defendant remaining on remand is Gregg Scott, the current program director responsible for implementing policies at Rushville.

In all other respects we AFFIRM the district court's judgment.

Lane v Williams


9-14-2015 Illinois:

Lane v Williams

The plaintiffs were convicted of sex crimes and completed their sentences years ago, but they remain in state custody as civil detainees pursuant to Illinois' Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act, 725 ILCS 207/1-99. Proceeding pro se, and then with the assistance of appointed counsel, the plaintiffs asserted a variety of claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging constitutional problems with the conditions of their confinement at Rushville Treatment and Detention Center.

On appeal, only two issues remain:
  • (1) whether due process requires input from health professionals prior to restricting opportunities for in-person association among Rushville's six 75-person units and
  • (2) whether the First Amendment entitles detainees to use the facility's internal mail system instead of the U.S. mail to exchange letters with other detainees.

The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the nonmovant, and drawing all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Kuhn v. Goodlow, 678 F.3d 552, 555 (7th Cir.2012). Summary judgment is appropriate "when the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a)).

We affirm.