Civil Commitment: Court Decisions

Showing posts with label Appeal - Won - Remand. Show all posts

In re COMMITMENT OF RICKY A. WILCOXEN

1-27-16 Illinois:

In re COMMITMENT OF RICKY A. WILCOXEN

Respondent, Ricky A. Wilcoxen, appeals from the trial court's order that found probable cause did not exist to warrant an evidentiary hearing to determine if respondent was still a sexually violent person. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

In 1992, respondent was sentenced to serve 22 years in prison for attempted criminal sexual assault. Pursuant to sentencing guidelines in effect at the time, his scheduled release date was May 4, 2002. On April 30, 2002, five days before he was to be released, the State filed a petition to have respondent declared a sexually violent person. 725 ILCS 207/1 et seq. (West 2002). Seven years later, in June 2009,[1] the matter proceeded to a jury trial. At trial, two of the State's experts testified that they reviewed the information contained in respondent's Illinois Department of Corrections files. Both experts opined that if respondent was released into the community there was a substantial probability that he would reoffend. The defense expert, Dr. Luis Rosell, agreed that respondent continued to meet the diagnosis for pedophilia, but opined that respondent was not a sexually violent person.

... ... ...

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the circuit court of Fulton County is reversed and remanded with directions.

Reversed and remanded with directions.

In re Zishka

3-6-2015 Kansas:

In re Zishka

Paul Dale Zishka appeals the district court's decision at his annual review hearing to maintain his status in treatment in the Sexual Predator Treatment Program. On appeal, Zishka argues that the district court violated his rights when it failed to hold a hearing and failed to appoint an attorney to represent him. We agree.

Persons involuntarily committed as sexually violent predators are entitled to an annual review hearing at which they are represented by counsel. Here, the district court gave no hearing notice and simply signed a proposed order—submitted by the State— finding that Zishka should remain in the treatment program. In addition, although Zishka twice asked in writing to have counsel appointed to represent him, the district court did not do so. We therefore reverse the district court and remand to hold Zishka's review hearing after appointing counsel to represent him.

With that summary, let's review Zishka's appeal in greater detail. In 2008, Zishka was involuntarily committed as a sexually violent predator under the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act (the Act), K.S.A. 59-29a01 et seq. Since that time, he has been in state custody at the Larned State Hospital. He must remain in state custody until he makes sufficient progress in treatment that he qualifies for transitional release and, potentially, final discharge from the Sexual Predator Treatment Program. See In re Burch, 296 Kan. 215, 219-20, 291 P.3d 78 (2012).

3-20-2013 New Jersey:

In the matter of Civil Commitment of L.M.R.
No. A-1200-12T2.

The State appeals from an October 18, 2012 order declining to continue L.M.R.'s civil commitment pursuant to the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA), N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.24 to-27.38, and ordering his release from the Special Treatment Unit (STU). By order dated November 15, 2012, we stayed L.M.R.'s release and expedited this appeal. Having reviewed the record, we now affirm the order on appeal.

I.
In 2003, L.M.R. (defendant) pled guilty to second-degree endangering the welfare of a child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4a. He was sentenced to seven years in prison, half to be served without parole, plus community supervision for life (CSL) pursuant to Megan's Law. See N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4d. The guilty plea was based on a 2002 incident in which defendant, who was intoxicated at the time, attempted to sexually assault his paramour's fourteen-year-old daughter. L.M.R. desisted after the victim's younger brother came into the room and interrupted the assault. Defendant was evaluated at the Adult Diagnostic and Treatment Center (ADTC), but was found not to be a repetitive and compulsive sex offender, in part because he had no prior arrests or convictions for sexual offenses.1

In his ADTC report, Dr. Mark Frank discounted defendant's explanation of the incident. Defendant claimed that he did not attempt to have sex with the victim but only entered her bedroom in the hope that she would tell her mother, who in turn would "call the police and have him arrested." Defendant said he wanted to get arrested because he needed substance abuse treatment. Dr. Frank noted defendant's long history of substance abuse; he recommended intensive treatment for that problem, plus psychotherapy to help L.M.R. understand why he committed the offense and avoid a recurrence. ... ... ...

Further, a sexually violent predator is one who "suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes the person [highly] likely to engage in acts of sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility for control, care and treatment." N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.26 (emphasis added); W.Z., supra, 173 N.J. at 133-34. Nothing in that definition suggests that a judge cannot consider a sex offender's entire situation in determining whether he needs to be confined in the STU or can be released following an initial commitment hearing. In fact, the State's reply brief concedes that "external factors like CSL may be considered by experts among the many factors examined in determining whether an offender is capable of controlling his sexually violent behaviors." We conclude that is what happened in this case. On this record, we find no error in the judge considering CSL as one of an array of factors bearing on whether L.M.R. can live in the community without being highly likely to commit additional sexual offenses.

As L.M.R. himself acknowledged to Dr. Stewart, it is very important that he refrain from drugs and alcohol when released, because those are dis-inhibitors that may make him more likely to relapse into offending. The parole supervision available through CSL is one mechanism to require regular drug testing, as well as outpatient sex offender therapy. CSL also allows the State to place appropriate limitations on where L.M.R. lives and works. And it is a particularly powerful form of supervision because failure to comply may result in L.M.R.'s arrest and incarceration. See N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4d.4 Moreover, as we were advised at oral argument, the same parole officers supervise offenders paroled on CSL and persons released from the STU on conditional discharge. We find nothing inappropriate in Judge Mulvihill, having found that L.M.R. was not highly likely to re-offend, nonetheless making some sensible recommendations as to the conditions of his parole supervision.

Accordingly, we vacate the stay previously entered in this matter, and order that L.M.R. be released from the STU no later than ten days after the date of this opinion. We extend the stay for that limited period to (a) permit L.M.R.'s assigned parole officer to meet with L.M.R. at the STU prior to his release, should the officer choose to do so; and (b) permit the orderly disposition of a stay application to the Supreme Court, should the State decide to promptly file such a motion. We do not, however, recommend that any further stay be granted.

Affirmed. ..Source..

IN THE MATTER OF THE CIVIL COMMITMENT OF R.F. SVP 490-08.

3-19-2014 New Jersey:

IN THE MATTER OF THE CIVIL COMMITMENT OF R.F. SVP 490-08.

Before the State can deprive a person of his freedom, either in a criminal trial or a civil commitment hearing, the State must satisfy a high standard of proof. Under the New Jersey Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA or Act), N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.24 to-27.38, a person previously convicted of a sexual offense can be civilly committed only if the State can establish by clear and convincing evidence that he suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes him highly likely to commit a sexually violent offense.

The experienced judges assigned to hear these cases have the difficult task of assessing expert testimony that often is in conflict, making factfindings about events described from varying viewpoints, and ultimately predicting the probability of a person's future conduct. In the balance, an individual's right to liberty is weighed against society's interest in public safety.

In this case, R.F., when he was seventeen years old, engaged in sexual conduct with two children, ages twelve and thirteen. He pled guilty in adult court to endangering the welfare of both children and was sentenced to a five-year term at the Adult Diagnostic and Treatment Center at Avenel (ADTC or Avenel). Before R.F. completed his sentence, the State petitioned to have R.F. civilly committed under the SVPA.

At an SVPA commitment hearing, the Honorable Serena J. Perretti, J.S.C., sifted through a ream of documentary evidence and heard testimony from three expert witnesses, two for the State and one for R.F. Although Judge Perretti found that R.F. committed predicate sexual offenses and suffered from a personality disorder, she concluded that the State had not proven by clear and convincing evidence that R.F. was highly likely to engage in sexually violent behavior if not civilly committed.

In coming to the decision that the State had not met the evidentiary standard for SVPA commitment, Judge Perretti made specific findings of fact and ultimately placed decisive weight on R.F.'s expert. She also made clear that R.F. is subject to parole supervision for life, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4; N.J.A.C. 10A:71-6.12. R.F., moreover, must also comply with a discharge plan prepared by the Special Treatment Unit (STU) where he has been civilly committed.

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Judge Perretti's determination that the State did not establish by clear and convincing evidence that R.F. was highly likely to sexually reoffend unless institutionalized is supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record. Her findings are not clearly mistaken and are entitled to deference. We therefore reverse the Appellate Division and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

In light of the passage of more than five years between Judge Perretti's decision and our resolution today, we will stay the release of R.F. for thirty days to allow the State to file a new petition if there are any changed circumstances or conditions that would warrant civil commitment. On his release, R.F. will be subject to a discharge plan and parole supervision for life.

Sex offender confined to controversial Missouri facility gets a break

6-18-2014 Missouri:

A state appeals court agreed on Tuesday with a child molester’s claim that an assessment by a panel of experts should have been allowed as evidence before he was locked up indefinitely as a sexually violent predator.

The multidisciplinary panel of mental health and criminal justice professionals had unanimously agreed that Lester Bradley did not meet Missouri’s definition of a sexually violent predator. But during his civil commitment trial, the state attorney general’s office blocked the report, arguing that the information was inadmissible per state statute. A probate judge agreed.

A Jackson County jury later determined Bradley was a sexually violent predator who should be committed for treatment in a secure facility.

“Because the court erred in determining that the assessment was inadmissible ... we reverse the probate court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings,” Western District appeals court judge Karen King Mitchell wrote in her 3-0 opinion.

4-23-2014 Minnesota:

The Minnesota Supreme Court has taken the unusual step of reversing the commitment of a man to the Minnesota Sex Offender Program and sent the case back to a lower court for further proceedings.

The high court reaffirmed Wednesday that courts must find sex offenders "highly likely" to reoffend before civilly committing them to the secure treatment program, which is the subject of a constitutional challenge in federal court and debate at the Legislature. But the justices said judges need to make formal findings of fact on whether less restrictive treatment programs are available.

So the justices sent the case of Cedrick Scott Ince (INTS) back to Sibley County District Court for clarification. His lawyers say they'll argue he should be freed on intensive supervised release pending a final ruling. ..Source.. by STEVE KARNOWSKI

In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Cedrick Scott Ince.
Court of Appeals.
1. The term “likely,” as used in the determination of whether a person is “likely to engage in acts of harmful sexual conduct” under Minn. Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 18c(a) (2012), does not indicate a defined numeric level of certainty or require that the fact-finder be substantially certain that the person will engage in acts of harmful sexual conduct. We continue to adhere to our previous construction of this provision, which requires evidence that the person is “highly likely” to engage in acts of harmful sexual conduct. In re Linehan (Linehan III), 557 N.W.2d 171, 180 (Minn. 1996), vacated sub nom. Linehan v. Minnesota, 522 U.S. 1011 (1997).

2. The determination of whether an individual is highly likely to engage in acts of harmful sexual conduct should be based on the multi-factor analysis for dangerousness prediction adopted in In re Linehan (Linehan I), 518 N.W.2d 609 (Minn. 1994), and all other evidence, including actuarial data, that the district court finds relevant and reliable. The relative weight provided to each Linehan factor and other evidence should be determined on a case-by-case basis by the district court.

3. Findings of fact that support the district court’s conclusions on the availability of a less restrictive treatment program must be sufficient to permit meaningful appellate review.

4. Because of the unusual nature of the facts and circumstances presented, a remand to the district court for reconsideration in light of this opinion is required to reevaluate whether appellant is highly likely to engage in acts of harmful sexual conduct and whether a less restrictive alternative for treatment is available.

In re Detention Calvin Matlock

3-13-15 Iowa:

In re Detention Calvin Matlock

A person committed under the Sexually Violent Predator Act alleges his release with supervision violates the Due Process Clauses of the Iowa and the United States Constitutions.

We find the statutory scheme contained in Iowa Code sections 229A.8 and 229A.9A does not violate the Due Process Clauses of the Iowa and the United States Constitutions as long as: the person continues to suffer from a mental abnormality, the testimony supports the need for supervision, and the supervision strikes the right balance between the need to protect the community and the person's liberty interest.

Applying these principles to this appeal, we find the committed person still suffers from a mental abnormality and the testimony supports his release with supervision. Thus, we affirm that part of the district court's judgment.

We are not satisfied the State met its burden to prove the release conditions adopted by the district court balance the need to protect the community and the person's liberty interest.

Accordingly, we remand the case to the district court to review the release conditions and enter the appropriate order consistent with due process.