Please bear with us as we move decisions into this blog.
Thanks eAdvocate
Showing posts with label .c In Progress. Show all posts
Showing posts with label .c In Progress. Show all posts

Childress v Hankins

1-8-2016 Illinois:

Plaintiff is civilly detained in the Rushville Treatment and Detention Center pursuant to the Illinois Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act, 725 ILCS 207/1, et seq. He alleges that he is a paraplegic, needing frequent daily catheterizations to empty his bladder, a wheelchair, a wheelchair-accessible room and toilet, grab bars by the toilet, and a shower seat. For years Plaintiff has allegedly received these accommodations, per order of the doctor on site.

On June 18, 2015, Plaintiff was allegedly removed from his room and placed in a segregation cell without the necessary accommodations or any written notice of any rules he had broken. Handcuffs were allegedly placed too tightly on Plaintiff intentionally during the transport, and Plaintiff was wheeled to segregation in an aggressive manner intended to frighten him.

All of the Defendants allegedly ignored Plaintiff's pleas for a room that would accommodate his medical condition, remarking that Plaintiff should have thought of that before pursuing lawsuits against them. For six days Plaintiff was allegedly kept in the cell with no way to safely use the toilet or to clean himself. He was not permitted to send out any correspondence, including legal mail. He was allegedly forced to sit and lay in his own urine and feces, with no change of clothes, soap, toothpaste, toothbrush, or other necessities during this entire time.

Brown v Dept of Health and Human Services

9-29-2015 Nebraska:

Brown v Dept of Health and Human Services [2015] (See also: 2014 Memorandum and Order)

This matter is before the court on a Motion to Dismiss (Filing No. 39) Plaintiff Cornelius Brown's Amended Complaint. When Brown filed his Amended Complaint, he was confined to inpatient treatment at the Norfolk Regional Center ("NRC") in Norfolk, Nebraska. The Motion to Dismiss was filed by Bob Gibson, the director of the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services ("NDHHS"), and the following staff of the NRC: TiLnne Bouer, a facility operating officer; Kristine Simmons, an associate facility operating officer; John Kroll, the director of nursing, and Lori Strong, Dianna Mastny and Nancy Wragge, nurses at the NRC (together, "State Defendants").

State Defendants argue Brown's claims for damages against them in their official capacities are barred by sovereign immunity. In addition, they argue Gibson, Bouer, Simmons, and Kroll are entitled to qualified immunity. Finally, they argue Brown failed to state cognizable constitutional claims against Wragge, Mastny, and Strong. (Filing No. 40.) For the reasons that follow, the court will dismiss all of Brown's claims except his retaliation claims against Strong and Mastny in their individual capacities.

BACKGROUND

Brown filed his original Complaint (Filing No. 1) on September 30, 2014. He filed two Supplements (Filing Nos. 14 and 15) to his Complaint on November 4 and December 2, 2014. Brown, a black male, alleged staff at the NRC failed to address patients' use of racially derogatory language. In addition, he alleged two NRC staff, Strong and Mastny, retaliated against him by taking steps to ensure he could not advance in his sex-offender treatment program when they learned Brown had filed a civil action in this court.

Powers v Block

10-27-2015 Illinois:

Powers v Block

Powers' Complaint states a claim for violating his due process rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Brown v. Budz, 398 F.3d 904, 910 (7th Cir. 2005). The United States Supreme Court has held that "due process requires that the conditions and duration of confinement under the Act bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which persons are committed." Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 265 (2001). The Supreme Court has also opined that involuntarily committed mentally challenged persons have a substantive due process right to "conditions of reasonable care and safety, reasonably nonrestrictive confinement conditions, and such training as may be required by these conditions." Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982).

The Seventh Circuit has extended and summarized Youngerberg to include those individuals committed because they are sexually violent: "(a) committed persons are entitled to some treatment, and (b) what that treatment entails must be decided by mental-health professionals." Lane v. Williams, 689 F.3d 879, 882 (7th Cir. 2012)(internal quotation omitted). In other words, the Seventh Circuit has held that "Youngerberg holds that, under the due process clause, detainees are entitled to non-punitive programs designed using the exercise of professional judgment. . . ." Id. at 883.

Here, Powers has alleged that his treatment at Rushville has been so minimal and so inadequate that it has violated his Due Process Rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Fourteenth Amendment requires that Powers receive some treatment. Powers has alleged that he is, essentially, not receiving any. Therefore, Powers has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted against Defendants Jennifer Block, Gerrold Carreon, Shan Jumper, and Liberty Health Care Corporation.

In addition, Powers has alleged that Defendants Block, Carreon, Jumper, and Paula Lodge have retaliated against him because he has previously filed grievances and lawsuits against them and others at Rushville. Specifically, Powers contends that Defendants have threatened him, removed privileges, and withheld treatment because he has filed grievances and lawsuits. As such, Powers has stated a retaliation claim in violation of his First Amendment rights.

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED:

Hughes v. Mitchell-Lawshea


6-29-2012 Illinois:

Hughes v. Mitchell-Lawshea

The four Plaintiffs in this action are detained in the Rushville Treatment and Detention Center and seek leave to proceed in forma pauperis. The "privilege to proceed without posting security for costs and fees is reserved to the many truly impoverished litigants who, within the District Court's sound discretion, would remain without legal remedy if such privilege were not afforded to them." Brewster v. North Am. Van Lines, Inc., 461 F.2d 649, 651 (7th Cir. 1972). Additionally, a court must dismiss cases proceeding in forma pauperis "at any time" if the action is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim, even if part of the filing fee has been paid. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)(2).

In reviewing the complaint, the Court accepts the factual allegations as true, liberally construing them in Plaintiffs' favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013). However, conclusory statements and labels are insufficient. Enough facts must be provided to "`state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.'" Alexander v. U.S., 721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013)(quoted cite omitted).

The Plaintiffs allege they are provided inadequate dental care at the Rushville facility and the Defendants have been deliberately indifferent to their serious dental conditions. Plaintiffs state Defendant Dr. Jacqueline Mitchell-Lawshea is the only dentist for all 600 residents, works only 15 hours a week, and leaves detainees to suffer without treatment. For instance, Plaintiff Michael Hughes says he submitted a Health Care Request (HCR) for a painful cavity which was diagnosed on June 29, 2014, but one year later, he still has not received treatment. Plaintiff Jeffrey Hargett says he filed an HCR regarding a painful hole in one of his teeth, but has never received treatment. Plaintiff Ronnie Brazzell filed a HCR regarding a painful cavity on October 27, 2013, but received no response for one year. Finally, Plaintiff Lawrence Hayes complained of constant pain from broken teeth, but it took several months to receive any response.

Dooley v. Kibby


5-18-2012 Illinois:

Dooley v. Kibby

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and currently detained in the Rushville Treatment and Detention Center, seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis on his claim of excessive force, inhumane conditions of confinement, and punishment without procedural due process.

...

Plaintiff is confined at the Rushville Treatment and Detention Center pursuant to the Illinois Sexually Violent Persons Act.

On or about July 9, 2011, Plaintiff was directed several times over the intercom to come to the kitchen and work. Plaintiff refused because it was his day off. Eventually, Defendant Haage came to Plaintiff's room and directed him to back up to the access hole in the door so that Plaintiff could be handcuffed. Plaintiff refused, and Haage called in an extraction team of six members.

Plaintiff capitulated when the extraction team arrived, backing up to the chuck hole with his hands behind him. After cuffs were placed, one of the extraction team members yanked the chain forcefully, pulling Plaintiff's hands up to his shoulders, causing "extensive damage" to Plaintiff's right hand. The incident was allegedly captured on video tape. The members of the extraction team were Defendants Chenoweth, Angel, Zimmerman, Keller, Teel, and Maloney.

Plaintiff was then forced to walk backwards to the health care unit and placed in a "glass jail cell." His clothes were torn off and the cell mattress was removed. For three days, the cell lacked operable plumbing or a mattress. Plaintiff was given only four squares of toilet paper on his third day.

Plaintiff was written a disciplinary report based on the incident, which apparently resulted in his segregation for thirty days. Plaintiff appears to be alleging that he did not receive adequate notice of the charges against him. He alleges that Defendant McAdory ordered the imposition of the segregation.

Brown v. McAdory


5-28-2015 Illinois:

Brown v. McAdory

Plaintiff proceeds pro se from his detention in the Rushville Treatment and Detention Center. His claims arise from his segregation between July 22-August 8, 2010, and again from March 24-April 4, 2011.

In Higgs v. Carver, 286 F.3d 437, 438 (7th Cir. 2002), the Seventh Circuit stated that "[a] pretrial detainee cannot be placed in segregation as a punishment for a disciplinary infraction without notice and an opportunity to be heard; due process requires no less." Defendants do not label the confinement Plaintiff experienced "segregation," but it effectively was.

Plaintiff was placed in an empty room by himself with nothing but the clothes on his back and, in the 2010 incident but not the 2011 incident, a mattress. He had no freedom of movement, no property, no hygiene supplies, and no change of clothes. His conditions were not like the mild punishment imposed on a Rushville resident in Miller v. Dobier, 634 F.3d 412 (7th Cir. 2011), as Defendants argue. The resident in Miller could leave his cell, have visitors, and have some property. Higgs clearly establishes that Plaintiff was entitled to due process before his placement in segregation. Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity.

On October 14, 2014, the Court denied summary judgment and identified the following claims for trial: (1) lack of procedural due process before Plaintiff's placement in what amounted to segregation cells; (2) a violation of Plaintiff's First Amendment rights to communicate while he was in those cells; and, (3) a claim that the conditions of the cells on both occasions deprived Plaintiff of basic necessities. The Court assumes familiarity with that opinion.

Before the Court are Defendants' supplemental summary judgment motions on the First Amendment and procedural due process claims.

... ... ...

IT IS ORDERED:

1. Defendants' supplemental motions for summary judgment are granted in part and denied in part (109, 110). Summary judgment is granted to Defendants on Plaintiff's First Amendment claims and on his procedural due process claims arising from the 2010 incident. The motions are otherwise denied.

2. Defendants' unopposed motion to compel is granted (102). Plaintiff is directed to respond to any outstanding discovery requests by June 1, 2015.

3. Attorney Daniel Noll is appointed as pro bono counsel to represent Plaintiff at the trial and in any further pretrial proceedings. Discovery will not be reopened.

4. A status conference is scheduled for June 12, 2015 at 2:00 p.m. to discuss whether the parties will consent to Magistrate Judge Schanzle-Haskins and to set a trial date. The final pretrial conference remains scheduled for July 8, 2015, at this point.

5. The clerk is directed to alert the pro bono coordinator of the appointment of pro bono counsel in this case.

6. The clerk is directed to issue a video writ to secure Plaintiff's presence at the status conference on June 12, 2015. Counsel shall appear in person.

Bell v Caskey


3-31-2014 Illinois:

Bell v Caskey

Plaintiff Timothy Bell, proceeding pro se from his detention in the Rushville Treatment and Detention Center ("Rushville"), seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis on his claims against Defendants Herbert and Irina Caskey, the co-owners of Liberty Mental Health Corporation. ....

Bell alleges that, after completing his prison sentence on March 6, 2006, he was detained as a sexually violent person by the Illinois Department of Human Services. On July 27, 2007, a jury found Bell to be a sexually violent person pursuant to Illinois law, and he was subsequently housed in Rushville.

Bell claims that, since being placed in Rushville, he has not received any treatment for his condition. Bell alleges that the Liberty Mental Health Corporation ("Liberty") maintains a contract with the Illinois Department of Human Services to provide sex offender treatment to Rushville's residents, but Liberty has failed to provide any such treatment. Bell has sued Liberty's owners, Herbert Caskey and Irina Caskey, for violating his Constitutional rights by failing to provide sex offender treatment to him. ....

The Court finds that Bell's Complaint states a claim for violating his due process rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The United States Supreme Court has held that "due process requires that the conditions and duration of confinement under the Act bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which persons are committed." Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 265 (2001). The Supreme Court has also opined that involuntarily committed mentally retarded persons have a substantive due process right to "conditions of reasonable care and safety, reasonably nonrestrictive confinement conditions, and such training as may be required by these conditions." Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982).

... ... ...

In the instant case, Bell has alleged that the Caskeys maintain a contract with the State of Illinois and that they maintain a policy or custom of not providing treatment to Rushville residents. This allegation is sufficient to cause Defendants to become state actors for purposes of this initial merit review. King v. Chapman, ___ F. Supp. 2d ___, 2013 WL 6709623, * 20 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 16, 2013).

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis [2] is GRANTED. Pursuant to the Court's February 11, 2014 Order, no reduced filing fee will be assessed.

2. Pursuant to a review of the Complaint, the Court finds that Plaintiff states a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim against Defendants for failure to offer treatment during his confinement at Rushville. Any additional claim(s) shall not be included in the case except at the Court's discretion on motion by a party for good cause shown or pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15.

3. This case is now in the process of service. Plaintiff is advised to wait until counsel has appeared for Defendants before filing any motions in order to give Defendants notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before Defendants' counsel has filed an appearance will generally be denied as premature. Plaintiff need not submit any evidence to the Court at this time unless otherwise directed by the Court.

4. The Court will attempt service on Defendants by mailing each Defendant a waiver of service. Defendants have 60 days from service to file an Answer. If Defendants have not filed Answers or appeared through counsel within 60 days of the entry of this Order, Plaintiff may file a motion requesting the status of service. After counsel has appeared for Defendants, the Court will enter an Order scheduling deadlines for discovery and dispositive motions.

5. With respect to a Defendant who no longer works at the address provided by Plaintiff, the entity for whom that Defendant worked while at that address shall provide to the Clerk said Defendant's current work address, or, if not known, said Defendant's forwarding address. This information shall be used only for effectuating service. Documentation of forwarding addresses shall be retained only by the Clerk and shall not be maintained in the public docket nor disclosed by the Clerk.

6. Defendants shall file an Answer within 60 days of the date the waiver is sent by the clerk. A motion to dismiss is not an Answer. The Answer should include all defenses appropriate under the Federal Rules. The Answer and subsequent pleadings shall be to the issues and claims stated in this Order. In general, an answer sets forth Defendants' positions. The Court does not rule on the merits of those positions unless and until a motion is filed by Defendants. Therefore, no response to the Answer is necessary or will be considered.

7. Once counsel has appeared for a Defendant, Plaintiff need not send copies of his filings to that Defendant or to that Defendant's counsel. Instead, the Clerk will file Plaintiff's document electronically and send a notice of electronic filing to defense counsel. The notice of electronic filing shall constitute service on Defendants pursuant to Local Rule 5.3. If electronic service on Defendants is not available, Plaintiff will be notified and instructed accordingly.

8. Counsel for Defendants is hereby granted leave to depose Plaintiff at Plaintiff's place of confinement. Counsel for Defendants shall arrange the time for the deposition.

9. Plaintiff shall immediately notify the Court, in writing, of any change in his mailing address and telephone number. Plaintiff's failure to notify the Court of a change in mailing address or phone number will result in dismissal of this lawsuit with prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT THE CLERK IS DIRECTED TO: 1) SHOW PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS [2] AS GRANTED; 2) ATTEMPT SERVICE ON DEFENDANTS PURSUANT TO THE STANDARD PROCEDURES; AND 3) SET AN INTERNAL COURT DEADLINE 60 DAYS FROM THE ENTRY OF THIS ORDER FOR THE COURT TO CHECK ON THE STATUS OF SERVICE AND ENTER SCHEDULING DEADLINES.

LASTLY, IT IS ORDERED THAT IF A DEFENDANT FAILS TO SIGN AND RETURN A WAIVER OF SERVICE TO THE CLERK WITHIN 30 DAYS AFTER THE WAIVER IS SENT, THE COURT WILL TAKE APPROPRIATE STEPS TO EFFECT FORMAL SERVICE THROUGH THE U.S. MARHSAL'S SERVICE ON THAT DEFENDANT AND WILL REQUIRE THAT DEFENDANT TO PAY THE FULL COSTS OF FORMAL SERVICE PURSUANT TO FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 4(d)(2).

Scott v Smith


3-31-2014 Illinois:

Scott v Smith

RULE 16.3 PRETRIAL PROCEDURES IN PRISONER AND DETAINEE CASES
The following procedures apply to civil cases filed by prisoners and civil detainees proceeding pro se. For purposes of this section, a “prisoner” is a person defined in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h). A “civil detainee” is a person held in detention or committed to civil law, including but not limited to persons detained or civilly committed pursuant to the Illinois Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act, 725 ILCS 207/1 et seq., or the Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act, 725 ILCS 205/0.01 et seq..

Click on case title for more..



Plaintiff Dennis Scott is a resident of Rushville Treatment and Detention Facility ("Rushville"). Plaintiff has been diagnosed with a medical condition that requires regular dialysis treatment. Typically, Plaintiff is scheduled to receive dialysis treatment on Monday, Wednesday, and Friday at 4 a.m. within the health care unit at Rushville. Plaintiff receives the treatment from Nurse Alice Ore ("Nurse Ore").

On Monday, March 25, 2013, inclement weather delayed Nurse Ore's arrival at Rushville. At approximately 8:00 a.m., Defendant Smith notified Plaintiff that Nurse Ore had arrived, and informed Plaintiff that he had ten (10) minutes to report for treatment. When Plaintiff arrived at the guard station, Defendant Smith refused to allow Plaintiff to leave the housing unit. Defendant Smith stated that Plaintiff had failed to report within ten (10) minutes of being called for treatment ("10-minute rule"). Therefore, Defendant Smith explained, Plaintiff would not be allowed to go to the health care unit. Plaintiff protested and informed Defendant Kerr, a supervisor on the day in question, that he was being denied his dialysis treatment. Defendant Kerr told Plaintiff that he would address Plaintiff's concerns when he returned from another unit. Defendant Kerr left the unit and never returned. Plaintiff did not receive dialysis treatment until Wednesday, March 27, 2013, five days after his previous treatment on Friday, March 22, 2013.

... ... ...

The Eighth Amendment proscription against cruel and unusual punishment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibit the denial of medical treatment for*77serious medical needs to those incarcerated within the prison system. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832. This right was clearly established on March 25, 2013. As discussed above, Plaintiff had a serious medical need that required treatment. A genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the Defendants were deliberately indifferent to those needs, and the Court cannot say that the complete denial of treatment to Plaintiff on the day in question was reasonable and consistent with the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity.IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that:

1) The Defendants' motion for summary judgment is denied pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. [17].
2) A status hearing is scheduled for March 26, 2015 at 1:45 p.m. .

The Plaintiff shall appear by video conference and the Defendants' attorney(s) shall appear in person before the court sitting in Urbana, Illinois. The clerk is to issue a writ for the Plaintiff's participation in the video conference. ..Source..

Walker v Scott


9-15-2015 Illinois:

Walker v Scott

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and civilly committed at Rushville Treatment and Detention Facility, brought the present lawsuit pursuant to the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based upon the refusal to provide Plaintiff with a diet that complied with his religious beliefs. The matter comes before the Court for ruling on the Defendants' respective motions for summary judgment (Docs. 26, 28).

Plaintiff is civilly committed at Rushville Treatment and Detention Facility ("Rushville" or "TDF"), and has been a member of the Islamic faith since 1987. As a Muslim, Plaintiff believes that he is "required to eat all of the things God commands [him] to eat." Pl. Dep. 58:1-4. This includes, among other things, meat prepared in accordance with Islamic law, and the avoidance of certain foods, including pork, foods contaminated with pork, and processed food products. Foods that meet these requirements are referred to as "Halal."

Plaintiff made several requests to be served a Halal diet to comply with the requirements of his faith. In the alternative, Plaintiff requested the Kosher diet served to Jewish residents as, according to his interpretation of the Koran and his own inquiry into the diet served at Rushville, Kosher and Halal diets were similar in both the types of foods allowed and the manner in which they are prepared.

These requests were denied on the following basis: "[Defendant] Billingsley [the Religious Coordinator] has spoken with several religious coordinators from other facilities and they indicate that the Kosher diet . . . [is] a direct violation of the Koran. The lacto vegan diet is what [Muslim inmates] receive in [the Illinois Department of Corrections]." (Doc. 29-5). Accordingly, Plaintiff was given a choice between being served the standard diet, which included those foods proscribed by Plaintiff's religious beliefs; and the lacto-ovo vegan or vegetarian diet ("vegetarian diet"), which lacks foods Plaintiff believes he is required to eat (Halal meat).

Plaintiff's requests for a Kosher diet were denied because he does not identify as a member of the Jewish faith. (Doc. 29-7).

... ... ...

For the reasons discussed above, genuine issues of material fact exist with regards to whether the Defendants' denial of Plaintiff's request for a religious diet violates Plaintiff's rights as enumerated under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act and the First Amendment. Therefore, the Defendants' motions for summary judgment are denied.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that:

1) Defendant Dredge's Motion for Summary Judgment [26] is DENIED. Defendants Scott, Billingsley, Blaesing, Houzenga, and Winters Motion for Summary Judgment [28] is GRANTED in part, and DENIED in part. Defendants' Motion [28] is GRANTED in full as to Defendant Winters, and DENIED as to all other Defendants. Clerk is directed to dismiss Defendant Winters with prejudice. Defendant Scott is dismissed with regard to Plaintiff's First Amendment Claims.

2) A final pretrial conference is scheduled for January 20, 2016 at 1:30 p.m.. The Plaintiff shall appear by video conference and the Defendants' attorney(s) shall appear in person before the court sitting in Springfield, Illinois. The clerk is to issue a writ for the Plaintiff's participation in the video conference.

3) The Court will send out proposed jury instructions and intends to ask the standard voir dire questions published on the Court's website (ilcd.uscourts.gov/local rules and orders/orders and rules by Judge/Judge Myerscough/General Voir Dire Procedure). By December 16, 2015, the parties shall file: 1) an agreed proposed pretrial order; 2) alternate or additional jury instructions (no duplicates); 3) motions in limine; and, (4) additional voir dire questions (not duplicative of the Court's). All proposed instructions shall be clearly marked, identifying the party, the number, and whether the instruction is additional or alternate (i.e., Pl.'s 1, additional; Pl.'s 2, alternate to Court's 3).

4) The Plaintiff and Defendants shall appear in person at trial. Residents of Rushville Treatment and Detention Facility who are not parties to this case shall appear by video conference and Rushville TDF employees who are not parties may also appear by video conference at trial. Other nonparty witnesses may appear by video at the court's discretion. Therefore, the proposed pretrial order must include: (1) the name, resident number and place of incarceration for each inmate to be called as a witness; (2) the name and place of employment for each Department of Human Services employee to be called as a witness; and, (3) the names and addresses of any witnesses who are not residents or employees for whom a party seeks a trial subpoena. The party seeking the subpoena must provide the necessary witness and mileage fees pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45.

5) A jury trial is scheduled for February 9, 2016 at 9:00 a.m. at the U.S. Courthouse in Springfield, Illinois. No writs to issue at this time.

Walker v Jumper


8-18-2014 Illinois:

Walker v Jumper

Plaintiff Ronald D. Walker, proceeding pro se from his detention in the Rushville Treatment and Detention Center ("Rushville"), seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis on his claims against Defendants.

Walker alleges that he has been in the Illinois Department of Human Services' ("IDHS") custody since 2003. During this time, Walker alleges that he has received ineffective psychiatric treatment for his condition. In fact, Walker contends that his treatment has been so deficient that it amounts to no treatment at all. Without effective treatment, Walker cannot progress through the IDHS program and cannot be released from IDHS's custody.

Walker believes that Defendants' actions in this regard are purposeful because they and their employer, Liberty Healthcare, receive millions of taxpayer dollars to operate the IDHS facility at Rushville. Therefore, Defendants have an incentive to violate Walker's constitutional rights by refusing or failing to provide him with mental health treatment, thereby extending his confinement and continuing the flow of tax payer dollars. Accordingly, Walker has filed this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Defendants have and are violating his Fourteenth Amendment rights.

To the extent that Walker is averring that Defendants are violating his due process rights by providing him with mental health treatment and counseling that he disagrees with or that he believes is ineffective, Walker's Complaint fails to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has held that a detainee who is confined as a sexually dangerous person in Illinois does not have the right to receive an alternative treatment of his own choosing. Ambrose v. Godinez, 2013 WL 647292, * 2 (7th Cir. Feb. 22, 2013); Allison v. Snyder, 332 F.3d 1076 (7th Cir.2003)(sex offender group therapy does not violate privilege against self-incrimination or due process rights). Accordingly, Walker cannot proceed on a claim against Defendants that the treatment that he is receiving should be more narrowly tailored to meet his own, personal needs. Levi v. William, 2007 WL 2893647, * 1 (C.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2007)("Plaintiff states no constitutional claim about the group therapy or Defendants' refusal to provide individual therapy.").

However, giving Walker's Complaint a liberal reading, Walker could be alleging that Defendants have, essentially, failed to provide him with any mental health treatment whatsoever. To the extent that this is Walker's allegation, Walker's Complaint states a cause of action upon which relief can be granted.

The United States Supreme Court has held that "due process requires that the conditions and duration of confinement under the Act bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which persons are committed." Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 265 (2001). The Supreme Court has also opined that involuntarily committed mentally retarded persons have a substantive due process right to "conditions of reasonable care and safety, reasonably nonrestrictive confinement conditions, and such training as may be required by these conditions." Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982).

And, the Seventh Circuit has extended and summarized Youngerberg to include those individuals committed because they are sexually violent: "(a) committed persons are entitled to some treatment, and (b) what that treatment entails must be decided by mental-health professionals." Lane v. Williams, 689 F.3d 879, 882 (7th Cir. 2012)(internal quotation omitted). In other words, the Seventh Circuit has held that "Youngerberg holds that, under the due process clause, detainees are entitled to non-punitive programs designed using the exercise of professional judgment . . . ." Id. at 883.

... ... ...

Here, Walker has alleged that his treatment has been so defective that it amounts to having received no treatment whatsoever since being placed into the IDHS's custody. The Fourteenth Amendment requires that Walker receive some treatment. Therefore, Walker has stated a cause of action upon which relief can be granted.

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis [3] is GRANTED. This Court has instituted a reduced payment procedure for indigent plaintiffs who are institutionalized but who are not prisoners as defined in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h). A reduced payment is assessed of 50% of such plaintiff's average monthly income for the six months preceding the filing of the complaint but not to exceed the $350 filing fee. Income includes additions to the plaintiff's trust fund from any sources, including gifts. Although he has submitted an affidavit in support of his motion, Plaintiff has not submitted his trust fund ledgers so that the Court can determine the amount, if any, of his reduced payment. Accordingly, Plaintiff is directed to file, within fourteen days of the date of this Order, his trust fund ledgers for the six months preceding the filing of this suit so that the Court can determine the amount, if any, of his reduced payment. Failure to comply with the Court's Order could result in the Court denying Plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis.

2. Pursuant to a review of the Complaint, the Court finds that Plaintiff states a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim against Defendants for failure to offer treatment during his confinement with IDHS. Any additional claim(s) shall not be included in the case except at the Court's discretion on motion by a party for good cause shown or pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15.

3. This case is now in the process of service. Plaintiff is advised to wait until counsel has appeared for Defendants before filing any motions in order to give Defendants notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before Defendants' counsel has filed an appearance will generally be denied as premature. Plaintiff need not submit any evidence to the Court at this time unless otherwise directed by the Court.

4. The Court will attempt service on Defendants by mailing each Defendant a waiver of service. Defendants have 60 days from service to file an Answer. If Defendants have not filed Answers or appeared through counsel within 60 days of the entry of this Order, Plaintiff may file a motion requesting the status of service. After counsel has appeared for Defendants, the Court will enter an Order scheduling deadlines for discovery and dispositive motions.

5. With respect to a Defendant who no longer works at the address provided by Plaintiff, the entity for whom that Defendant worked while at that address shall provide to the Clerk said Defendant's current work address, or, if not known, said Defendant's forwarding address. This information shall be used only for effectuating service. Documentation of forwarding addresses shall be retained only by the Clerk and shall not be maintained in the public docket nor disclosed by the Clerk.

6. Defendants shall file an Answer within 60 days of the date the waiver is sent by the clerk. A motion to dismiss is not an Answer. The Answer should include all defenses appropriate under the Federal Rules. The Answer and subsequent pleadings shall be to the issues and claims stated in this Order. In general, an answer sets forth Defendants' positions. The Court does not rule on the merits of those positions unless and until a motion is filed by Defendants. Therefore, no response to the Answer is necessary or will be considered.

7. Once counsel has appeared for a Defendant, Plaintiff need not send copies of his filings to that Defendant or to that Defendant's counsel. Instead, the Clerk will file Plaintiff's document electronically and send a notice of electronic filing to defense counsel. The notice of electronic filing shall constitute service on Defendants pursuant to Local Rule 5.3. If electronic service on Defendants is not available, Plaintiff will be notified and instructed accordingly.

8. Counsel for Defendants is hereby granted leave to depose Plaintiff at Plaintiff's place of confinement. Counsel for Defendants shall arrange the time for the deposition.

9. Plaintiff shall immediately notify the Court, in writing, of any change in his mailing address and telephone number. Plaintiff's failure to notify the Court of a change in mailing address or phone number will result in dismissal of this lawsuit with prejudice.

It is further ORDERED that the Clerk is directed to: (1) show Plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis [3] as granted; (2) attempt service on Defendants' pursuant to the standard procedures; and (3) set an internal Court deadline 60 days from the entry of this Order for the Court to check on the status of service and enter scheduling deadlines.

Lastly, it is ORDERED that, if a Defendant fails to sign and return a waiver of service to the Clerk within 30 days after the waiver is sent, the Court will take appropriate steps to effect formal service through the U.S. Marshal's Service on that Defendant and will require that Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(2).

Carpenter v Clayton


3-17-2015 Illinois:

Carpenter v Clayton

Plaintiff proceeds pro se on this civil rights case regarding Plaintiff's access to mental health treatment and sex offender treatment at the Rushville Treatment and Detention Center. His claims are: (1) Defendants refused or delayed in providing sex offender treatment to Plaintiff after he consented to that treatment; (2) Defendants refused to assign Plaintiff a therapist; and, (3) Defendants failed to have an adequate procedure for Plaintiff to obtain help during a mental health crisis Plaintiff allegedly experienced when a resident on his unit committed suicide. (Judge Myerscough's 2/29/13 order, d/e 7.) The defendants are involved in Plaintiff's mental health treatment. This case is not about retaliation against Plaintiff for Plaintiff's exercise of his First Amendment rights: that claim proceeds in another pending case before Judge Myerscough. Carpenter v. Clayton, et al., 13-CV-3073.

This case is now at the summary judgment stage, before this Court by the consent of the parties. After careful consideration of the parties' submissions, the Court concludes that Defendants' motion for summary judgment must be granted on all claims except the Plaintiff's claim about his delay in access to sex offender treatment after he consented to that treatment in September of 2011. The Court needs more information to make a determination on that claim. Accordingly, Defendants will be directed to file a supplemental motion for summary judgment.

... ... ...

IT IS ORDERED:

(1) Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted in part and denied in part (85). Summary judgment is denied, with leave to renew, on Plaintiff's claim about a delay in access to sex offender treatment after he consented to that treatment on September 19, 2011. Defendants' motion for summary judgment is otherwise granted.

(2) By April 30, 2015, Defendants shall file a supplemental motion for summary judgment on the remaining claim.

Mulder v Schuyler County Sheriff


3-12-2015 Illinois:

Mulder v Schuyler County Sheriff

Plaintiff is detained for treatment in the Rushville Treatment and Detention Center pursuant to the Illinois Sexually Violent Persons Act. He seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis.

Plaintiff is allegedly "one of the smaller residents at the facility," which, liberally construing his allegations, makes him more vulnerable to sexual harassment and assault by other detainees at the facility.

Plaintiff alleges that he has been forced to room with "other [sexually violent persons who] have all been diagnosed to lack volitional control and be predisposed to commit acts of violence and sexual violence." (Complaint, p. 4.) Plaintiff alleges that he has been sexually assaulted by two different roommates. When resident "E. Smith" roomed with Plaintiff at the beginning of this year, Smith allegedly made sexual advances and sexually touched Plaintiff. After Plaintiff complained, Plaintiff was roomed with resident David Mackel, who also made sexual advances to Plaintiff, grabbed Plaintiff's genitals, and "tr[ied] to force [Plaintiff] into more and more sexual contacts." (Complaint p. 6.)

One day in August, 2014, Defendant Morton loudly told Plaintiff in front of the entire housing unit, "If you were not up all night sucking dick, you wouldn't be so tired now." (Complaint p. 5.) Morton's comment allegedly perpetuated and encouraged the continued sexual harassment of Plaintiff by resident Mackel and other residents on the unit. Plaintiff told Defendants Ganz, Schroeder, and Louck about Defendant Morton's comment, but nothing was done.

Plaintiff complained to Defendants Clayton, Hankins, Pennock, Kulhan, Dougherty, Parsons, Rose, Billingsley, Kindhart, Teel, Thomas, Louck, Morton, Schroeder, Ganz, Jumper, Clark, and Deeds about resident Mackel's abuse and harassment. None of these Defendants did anything until August 22, 2014, when Plaintiff was moved to a segregation cell called "special management." While Plaintiff was in segregation, resident Morales slipped a note under Plaintiff's door offering Plaintiff cash in return for sexually abusing Plaintiff. Plaintiff turned the note into security.

Defendant Clayton, who was supposed to be investigating Plaintiff's complaints about the sexual harassment, instead allegedly threatened to have Plaintiff put in jail on false charges if Plaintiff tried to press criminal charges against resident Mackel. Clayton also allegedly told Plaintiff that Plaintiff deserved what he got because Plaintiff is a "`faggot.'" (Complaint p. 7.)

As a result of the constant sexual harassment, Plaintiff allegedly suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder—including the inability to function or sleep and constant hand-shaking for days. Defendants Ganz, Schroeder, Louck, and Jumper have refused to provide Plaintiff any mental health treatment for Plaintiff's post-traumatic stress disorder, telling Plaintiff that such treatment is not offered at the facility.

... ... ...

However, the Schuyler County Sheriff's Office will be dismissed as a Defendant because the Sheriff and Schuyler County do not operate the Rushville Treatment and Detention Center. Defendant Clayton's alleged threat to have the Sheriff put Plaintiff in jail did not come to fruition, and the Sheriff is not liable for Clayton's alleged misconduct.

IT IS ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff's petition to proceed in forma pauperis is granted (3). Pursuant to a review of the Complaint, the Court finds that Plaintiff states the following constitutional claims: 1) deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm; 2) deliberate indifference to a serious need for mental health treatment; and 3) retaliation for Plaintiff's exercise of his First Amendment rights. This case proceeds solely on the claims identified in this paragraph. Any additional claims shall not be included in the case, except at the Court's discretion on motion by a party for good cause shown or pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15.

2. This case is now in the process of service. Plaintiff is advised to wait until counsel has appeared for Defendants before filing any motions, in order to give Defendants notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before Defendants' counsel has filed an appearance will generally be denied as premature. Plaintiff need not submit any evidence to the Court at this time, unless otherwise directed by the Court.

3. The Court will attempt service on Defendants by sending each Defendant a waiver of service. Defendants have 60 days from the date the waiver of service is sent to file an Answer. If Defendants have not filed Answers or appeared through counsel within 90 days of the entry of this order, Plaintiff may file a motion requesting the status of service. After counsel has appeared for Defendants, the Court will enter a scheduling order setting deadlines for discovery and dispositive motions.

4. With respect to a Defendant who no longer works at the address provided by Plaintiff, the entity for whom that Defendant worked while at that address shall provide to the Clerk said Defendant's current work address, or, if not known, said Defendant's forwarding address. This information shall be used only for effectuating service. Documentation of forwarding addresses shall be retained only by the Clerk and shall not be maintained in the public docket nor disclosed by the Clerk.

5. Defendants shall file an answer within 60 days of the day the waiver of service is sent by the Clerk. A motion to dismiss is not an answer. The answer should include all defenses appropriate under the Federal Rules. The answer and subsequent pleadings shall be to the issues and claims stated in this Opinion.

6. Once counsel has appeared for a Defendant, Plaintiff need not send copies of his filings to that Defendant or to that Defendant's counsel. Instead, the Clerk will file Plaintiff's document electronically and send a notice of electronic filing to defense counsel. The notice of electronic filing shall constitute service on Defendants pursuant to Local Rule 5.3. If electronic service on Defendants is not available, Plaintiff will be notified and instructed accordingly.

7. Counsel for Defendants is hereby granted leave to depose Plaintiff at Plaintiff's place of confinement. Counsel for Defendants shall arrange the time for the deposition.

8. Plaintiff shall immediately notify the Court, in writing, of any change in his mailing address and telephone number. Plaintiff's failure to notify the Court of a change in mailing address or phone number will result in dismissal of this lawsuit, with prejudice.

9. If a Defendant fails to sign and return a waiver of service to the clerk within 30 days after the waiver is sent, the Court will take appropriate steps to effect formal service through the U.S. Marshal's service on that Defendant and will require that Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(2).

10. Plaintiff's petition to proceed in forma pauperis is granted (3).

11. Plaintiff's motion for status is denied as moot (6).

12. The Clerk is directed to enter the standard qualified protective order pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act.

13. Defendant "Schuyler County Sheriffs Police" is dismissed and terminated.

14. The Clerk is directed to attempt service on Defendants pursuant to the standard procedures.