Civil Commitment: Court Decisions: ( Plea Agreements

2-27-2014 Illinois:

People v Dodds

This is an appeal from the circuit court's order dismissing a petition to vacate judgment filed by the defendant, Paul Dodds, pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2000)). The defendant, who was charged with four counts of possession of child pornography (720 ILCS 5/11-20.1(a)(1) (West 2000)), pleaded guilty to one count in exchange for a sentence of 18 months' probation and the requirement that he register as a sex offender for a period of 10 years.

Apparently, at the time of sentencing, defense counsel, the State and the trial judge all mistakenly believed that the defendant was required to register only for 10 years, rather than natural life, as required by the Illinois Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) (730 ILCS 150/7 (West 2000)).[1] After the 10 years expired, the defendant was informed that he would have to register as a sex offender for natural life.

The defendant then filed a section 2-1401 petition (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2000)) seeking to vacate his conviction and sentence. The defendant argued that: (1) his sentence was void because the trial court lacked the authority to impose a sentence not permitted by law; and (2) his guilty plea was involuntary because: (a) his counsel was ineffective and (b) the State breached its promise that the defendant be required to register only for 10 years, rather than natural life, thereby depriving the defendant of due process of law.

The State filed and the circuit court granted a motion to dismiss the defendant's petition pursuant to sections 2-615 and 2-619 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-615, 2-619 (West 2000)). The defendant now appeals that dismissal and asks this court to vacate his conviction and sentence. For the reasons that follow, we agree with the defendant, vacate his conviction and sentence and remand to the trial court with instructions.

... ... ...

32 Subsequent to Presley, our supreme court decided Hughes, 2012 IL 112817, affirmatively adopting the rationale in Padilla and applying it to a counsel's duty to advise a defendant of the possibility of involuntary commitment pursuant to the Illinois Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act (SVPCA) (725 ILCS 207/9 (West 2008)). In Hughes, a defendant who pleaded guilty to aggravated criminal sexual abuse filed a motion to vacate his plea after he was released from prison and the State filed a petition to have him declared a sexually violent person under the SVPCA. Hughes, 2012 IL 112817, ¶¶ 9-10. When the motion to vacate his plea was denied, the defendant appealed, arguing, inter alia, that under the United States Supreme Court decision in Padilla, his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered since his counsel never advised him that the plea could be used as a basis for filing a petition to have him declared a sexually violent person, subject to involuntary commitment. Hughes, 2012 IL 112817, ¶¶ 15-16. The appellate court affirmed, finding that traditionally the filing of a sexually violent person petition was a collateral consequence of the plea and that, therefore, the defendant had failed to establish that under Padilla counsel had a duty to advise him regrading the possibility of involuntary commitment. Hughes, 2012 IL 112817, ¶ 16.

¶ 33 Our supreme court disagreed and held that under Padilla, a counsel's failure to advise the defendant of the collateral consequence, i.e., the possibility that his plea would be used as a basis for the filing of a sexually violent person petition, rose to the level of ineffective performance of counsel. Hughes, 2012 IL 112817, ¶¶ 43-62.[6]

... ... ...

CONCLUSION

¶ 50 For all of the reasons stated above, we vacate the defendant's plea, conviction and sentence and remand to the circuit court for further proceedings before a different trial judge. In doing so, however, we remind the parties that they were unable to obtain the record from the underlying proceedings for purposes of this appeal, and that for this same reason, retrial may prove difficult.

¶ 51 Judgment vacated; reversed and remanded with instructions.

7-23-2012 New York:

US v Youngs

No Need for Civil Commitment Warning in Plea Bargain

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals held this week that a judge is not required to inform a child pornography defendant that his plea bargain could lead to civil commitment as a sexually dangerous person at the end of his prison term.

According to the appellate court, due process and Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not require the district court to advise a defendant of the possibility.

In 2008, Mark Allen Youngs waived indictment and pleaded guilty to producing child pornography and possessing child pornography. At his plea hearing, the district court reviewed in detail the plea agreement with Youngs and the various rights set forth in Rule 11.

As a part of this review, the court described the minimum and maximum sentences of imprisonment, the supervised release term that Youngs faced, the forfeiture of his computer equipment, and his obligations under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act following his release from incarceration. Youngs responded that he understood all of these consequences.

On appeal, Youngs argued that his plea was defective because the district court did not advise him of the possibility of civil commitment as a sexually dangerous person at the end of his prison term.

The Supreme Court has concluded that a defendant can make an intelligent and voluntary guilty plea satisfying due process if he is "fully aware of the direct consequences" of a guilty plea. Precedent in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, however, holds that certain possible consequences of a guilty plea are "collateral" rather than direct and don't have to be explained. Thus, district courts need not inform a defendant of collateral consequences during the plea colloquy.

Here, the Second Circuit concluded that the possibility of post-prison civil commitment was a collateral consequence that didn't warrant explanation during the plea colloquy because civil commitment is not "definite, immediate, and largely automatic."

While civil commitment doesn't meet the criteria of a direct consequence, continued incarceration seems like a pretty extreme collateral consequence. Is this a grey area that should be analyzed under a new set of standards?