Powers v Block

10-27-2015 Illinois:

Powers v Block

Powers' Complaint states a claim for violating his due process rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Brown v. Budz, 398 F.3d 904, 910 (7th Cir. 2005). The United States Supreme Court has held that "due process requires that the conditions and duration of confinement under the Act bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which persons are committed." Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 265 (2001). The Supreme Court has also opined that involuntarily committed mentally challenged persons have a substantive due process right to "conditions of reasonable care and safety, reasonably nonrestrictive confinement conditions, and such training as may be required by these conditions." Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982).

The Seventh Circuit has extended and summarized Youngerberg to include those individuals committed because they are sexually violent: "(a) committed persons are entitled to some treatment, and (b) what that treatment entails must be decided by mental-health professionals." Lane v. Williams, 689 F.3d 879, 882 (7th Cir. 2012)(internal quotation omitted). In other words, the Seventh Circuit has held that "Youngerberg holds that, under the due process clause, detainees are entitled to non-punitive programs designed using the exercise of professional judgment. . . ." Id. at 883.

Here, Powers has alleged that his treatment at Rushville has been so minimal and so inadequate that it has violated his Due Process Rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Fourteenth Amendment requires that Powers receive some treatment. Powers has alleged that he is, essentially, not receiving any. Therefore, Powers has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted against Defendants Jennifer Block, Gerrold Carreon, Shan Jumper, and Liberty Health Care Corporation.

In addition, Powers has alleged that Defendants Block, Carreon, Jumper, and Paula Lodge have retaliated against him because he has previously filed grievances and lawsuits against them and others at Rushville. Specifically, Powers contends that Defendants have threatened him, removed privileges, and withheld treatment because he has filed grievances and lawsuits. As such, Powers has stated a retaliation claim in violation of his First Amendment rights.

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED:

1st Cir: No Constitutional Violations at Massachusetts Sex Offender Treatment Center

9-2-2014 Massachusetts:

In Massachusetts, sexually dangerous persons (SDPs), sex offenders who have been ordered to civil commitment, reside in the Massachusetts Treatment Center in Bridgewater, Massachusetts. In 1974, following lawsuits alleging "medieval" conditions at the Center, a district count entered consent decrees ordering the Center to shape up. In 1999, the district court concluded that the problems had been remedied and terminated the consent decrees, but still made the Center subject to a settlement plan.

In 2001, Jeffrey Healey brought suit to enforce the provisions of the plan and to allege constitutional violations. After more litigation and two trials, the district court found that it had breached the terms of the plan by failing to provide "adequate pharmacological evaluation and treatment." This appeal followed, where the Massachusetts Department of Corrections (DOC) wanted the determination in Healey's favor reversed, along with a determination that the settlement plan wasn't an enforceable order.

Dooley v. Kibby

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5-18-2012 Illinois:

Dooley v. Kibby

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and currently detained in the Rushville Treatment and Detention Center, seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis on his claim of excessive force, inhumane conditions of confinement, and punishment without procedural due process.

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Plaintiff is confined at the Rushville Treatment and Detention Center pursuant to the Illinois Sexually Violent Persons Act.

On or about July 9, 2011, Plaintiff was directed several times over the intercom to come to the kitchen and work. Plaintiff refused because it was his day off. Eventually, Defendant Haage came to Plaintiff's room and directed him to back up to the access hole in the door so that Plaintiff could be handcuffed. Plaintiff refused, and Haage called in an extraction team of six members.

Plaintiff capitulated when the extraction team arrived, backing up to the chuck hole with his hands behind him. After cuffs were placed, one of the extraction team members yanked the chain forcefully, pulling Plaintiff's hands up to his shoulders, causing "extensive damage" to Plaintiff's right hand. The incident was allegedly captured on video tape. The members of the extraction team were Defendants Chenoweth, Angel, Zimmerman, Keller, Teel, and Maloney.

Plaintiff was then forced to walk backwards to the health care unit and placed in a "glass jail cell." His clothes were torn off and the cell mattress was removed. For three days, the cell lacked operable plumbing or a mattress. Plaintiff was given only four squares of toilet paper on his third day.

Plaintiff was written a disciplinary report based on the incident, which apparently resulted in his segregation for thirty days. Plaintiff appears to be alleging that he did not receive adequate notice of the charges against him. He alleges that Defendant McAdory ordered the imposition of the segregation.

Brown v. McAdory

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5-28-2015 Illinois:

Brown v. McAdory

Plaintiff proceeds pro se from his detention in the Rushville Treatment and Detention Center. His claims arise from his segregation between July 22-August 8, 2010, and again from March 24-April 4, 2011.

In Higgs v. Carver, 286 F.3d 437, 438 (7th Cir. 2002), the Seventh Circuit stated that "[a] pretrial detainee cannot be placed in segregation as a punishment for a disciplinary infraction without notice and an opportunity to be heard; due process requires no less." Defendants do not label the confinement Plaintiff experienced "segregation," but it effectively was.

Plaintiff was placed in an empty room by himself with nothing but the clothes on his back and, in the 2010 incident but not the 2011 incident, a mattress. He had no freedom of movement, no property, no hygiene supplies, and no change of clothes. His conditions were not like the mild punishment imposed on a Rushville resident in Miller v. Dobier, 634 F.3d 412 (7th Cir. 2011), as Defendants argue. The resident in Miller could leave his cell, have visitors, and have some property. Higgs clearly establishes that Plaintiff was entitled to due process before his placement in segregation. Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity.

On October 14, 2014, the Court denied summary judgment and identified the following claims for trial: (1) lack of procedural due process before Plaintiff's placement in what amounted to segregation cells; (2) a violation of Plaintiff's First Amendment rights to communicate while he was in those cells; and, (3) a claim that the conditions of the cells on both occasions deprived Plaintiff of basic necessities. The Court assumes familiarity with that opinion.

Before the Court are Defendants' supplemental summary judgment motions on the First Amendment and procedural due process claims.

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IT IS ORDERED:

1. Defendants' supplemental motions for summary judgment are granted in part and denied in part (109, 110). Summary judgment is granted to Defendants on Plaintiff's First Amendment claims and on his procedural due process claims arising from the 2010 incident. The motions are otherwise denied.

2. Defendants' unopposed motion to compel is granted (102). Plaintiff is directed to respond to any outstanding discovery requests by June 1, 2015.

3. Attorney Daniel Noll is appointed as pro bono counsel to represent Plaintiff at the trial and in any further pretrial proceedings. Discovery will not be reopened.

4. A status conference is scheduled for June 12, 2015 at 2:00 p.m. to discuss whether the parties will consent to Magistrate Judge Schanzle-Haskins and to set a trial date. The final pretrial conference remains scheduled for July 8, 2015, at this point.

5. The clerk is directed to alert the pro bono coordinator of the appointment of pro bono counsel in this case.

6. The clerk is directed to issue a video writ to secure Plaintiff's presence at the status conference on June 12, 2015. Counsel shall appear in person.

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